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Abstract 
 
This thesis discusses the significance of popular illegalities in contemporary South 
African service delivery.  Illegal access to and non-payment of services have been 
indentified by the government as a major criminal problem which undermines 
effective service delivery. By contrast, this thesis argues that popular illegalities are 
positive phenomenon which provides otherwise unobtainable benefits for the poor 
and also exposes the ability of communities to self-manage their own service 
provision. The thesis begins by surveying a variety of literature on this issue using 
both contemporary and historical literature. I then discuss the scope of popular 
illegalities in South Africa and the methods government has used to curtail them, 
with a particular emphasis on how this has been influenced by the adoption of neo-
liberal cost recovery initiatives.  Using case studies of three communities where 
illegal access is prevalent, I discuss both the motivations behind and significance of 
illegal water and electricity connections.  In conclusion, I argue that popular 
illegalities are a significant phenomenon in so far as they suggest new methods of 
delivering services. The prevalence of these illegalities is also important as it 
highlights many of the failings of official delivery. The thesis concludes on a 
hopeful note in arguing that illegalities may be inherently progressive in both 
benefiting the marginal and leading to the creation of radically autonomous spaces 
which can be viewed as laboratories of radical social change.  
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Chapter One:  Introduction 
 
1.1  Introduction 
 
This thesis explores the political significance of illegal water and 
electricity connections in post-apartheid South Africa. By focusing on 
service delivery I will be looking at one of the most contested issues in 
contemporary South Africa politics. Government’s ability to provide 
services is seen as one of the key indicators of its legitimacy and success. 
The provision of water and electricity to all citizens is one of the major 
goals of the post-apartheid state. Its ability to provide this quantifiable 
improvement in the lives of the masses is also a test of its ability to make 
a major break with the exclusion and oppression practised by the 
apartheid regime. Cases where government has been perceived as failing 
in this area have led to much political turmoil, with the emergence of 
activist social movements and service delivery riots.  
 
My aim is to look particularly at illegal water and electricity connections and 
to determine to what extent these ‘popular illegalities’ constitute a form of 
political resistance. The focus on electricity and water is significant for 
several reasons. Firstly, water and electricity are the two basic amenities of 
modern life, necessary for humans to both survive and flourish. But they have 
significance beyond the obvious material benefits which they provide. 
Symbolically the widespread provision of these services has come to stand as 
a powerful symbol of modernity itself. For example, in their discussion of 
urbanism, Graham and Marvin (2001:46) say that: 
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… the many uses of electricity, in particular, seemed to ensure a 
brilliant future for civilization ... competition to have the largest, most 
powerful and extensive electricity infrastructure along with the 
brightest night-time cityscapes and streets, was intense ... 
Standardising, extending and rolling out single, integrated electricity 
grids, from the uneven patchworks inherited from initial processes of 
entrepreneurialism, become a very metaphor for everything modern, 
exciting and transformative.  
 
Electricity has long been seen as more than a service: it has been regarded as 
a sign of humanity’s Promethean struggle to control nature. This heroic 
metaphor transcended ideological boundaries: while the United States was 
lighting up its cities, Lenin wrote that ‘Communism equals Soviets plus 
electricity’ (cited in Tod and Wheeler, 1978: 135). In recent years, the 
provision of basic services has, globally, become a site of political struggle 
and resistance. The increasing commodification of basic urban services has 
lead to the emergence of militant social movements which fight for better 
access to water and electricity. The privatization of water and energy has also 
led to so-called ‘IMF riots’ in many parts of the world, for example the 2000 
Bolivian water riots, demonstrating that basic services are a focal point of 
popular resistance. Environmental degradation is putting further strain on the 
production and distribution of water and electrical services. In particular, 
South Africa is threatened by water scarcity (Mail and Guardian, 31 October 
2008). This makes the equitable provision of basic services more complex. 
 3 
 
Anti-privatization activists push for a fundamental shift in the status of water 
and electricity away from commodities to being seen as public resources. The 
emergence of popular illegalities may already embody this shift and my 
thesis argues that rather than being acts of criminality, such activities 
represent a form of covert, popular development.  
 
1.2 Research Aims and Objectives  
 
The chief aim of this thesis is to explore the link between popular illegalities 
and political resistance. I aim to determine the reasons practitioners of 
popular illegalities give for their actions, but also look at the broader political 
significance of these illegalities. By exploring the motivations and 
implications of these illegalities, I hope to contribute to the literature on 
service delivery in South Africa. My aim throughout is to take illegalities 
seriously and to be attentive to the meaning practitioners themselves give for 
their engagement in illegalities. More than just a reaction to poverty, I argue 
that illegalities can be regarded as creative practices which may even point 
out new ways of delivering services equitably. While my focus is on South 
Africa, my research may also help improve understanding of popular 
illegalities in other parts of the world.  
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1.3 Methodology 
 
I begin with a survey of the history of popular illegalities in post-apartheid 
South Africa. I then explore the literature on popular illegalities, looking not 
only at how these illegalities have been interpreted in South Africa, but also 
at more general discussions of popular illegalities. This literature discussion 
establishes a framework to understand the links between popular illegalities 
and political resistance. As the literature shows, illegalities have a latent 
revolutionary capacity which transcends their role as an everyday, practical 
technique of adaptation and survival.  
 
I also aligned my research goals with my methods. Because I am committed 
to taking seriously the explanations practitioners of illegalities provide for 
their actions, it was necessary for me to conduct in-depth interviews with 
people who have illegal electricity and water connections. My interviews 
explored the motivations and implications of illegal connections and non-
payment for services. My original intention was to conduct a qualitative 
survey, in the form of a questionnaire, of several households which either 
receive services illegally, or do not pay for legal services. However, the 
sensitive nature of my questions meant that I had to take a more informal 
approach when conducting interviews. I conducted door-to-door interviews 
in the communities studied. Often the line of questioning had to be altered 
from respondent to respondent due to factors such as trust and willingness to 
be interviewed. Respondents were especially circumspect in revealing how 
and who supplies them with illegal services. Out of respect for their privacy I 
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asked two basic sets of questions. I asked why they were engaged in 
illegalities and what benefits it provided for them. I then asked general 
questions about services and their feelings towards government. The second 
set of questions provoked lively responses. I also relied on interviews with 
community activists in order to establish the linkages between popular 
illegalities and political resistance.  
 
In some cases, interviewees were willing to provide their names and have me 
use them. In others, interviewees preferred not to be identified. When the 
names of interviewees are given, it is with their permission.  
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1.4 Chapter Outline  
 
This first chapter has briefly outlined the project undertaken in this thesis. 
Chapter Two surveys the literature on popular illegalities. It begins by 
defining the concept of popular illegalities before looking at the various 
conceptual approaches to this phenomenon. Chapter Three outlines the nature 
and extent of illegalities in South African service delivery. It provides figures 
indicating the extent of illegal usage and non-payment, and provides a 
description of the various sorts of illegalities and of the techniques favoured 
by the government to ensure payment and prevent illegal access. Chapter 
Four reports on the fieldwork I conducted in three different communities 
around popular illegalities. Finally, in Chapter Five I discuss the significance 
and some of the possible implications of popular illegalities. 
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Chapter Two: An Overview of the Literature  
 
In this chapter I begin by providing a definition of popular illegalities. I then 
look at contemporary South African and African literature on this 
phenomenon. I also discuss some of the international literature on illegalities. 
While most of the literature discussed views illegalities in a positive light, I 
will conclude by looking at some of the arguments of those who regard it as a 
dangerous and destructive phenomenon.   
 
2.1 Defining Popular Illegalities  
 
Foucault first used the term ‘popular illegalities’ in Discipline and Punish, 
his analysis of the birth of the modern prison system (Foucault, 1979). 
Foucault was concerned with the creation of new forms of punishment which 
aimed at making the individual a self-regulating and productive member of 
society in line with the demands of the emergent capitalist society of the 19th
 
 
century. Foucault defined popular illegalities in terms of the different kinds 
of behaviour which existed across social strata in pre-revolutionary France. 
These included: 
The refusal to pay taxes and rents or to comply with conscription, the 
violent confiscation of hoarded goods, the looting of shops and the 
forced selling of products at a fair price, confrontations with the 
representatives of power (Foucault, 1979: 274). 
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While these may have begun as localized practices they, gradually began to 
cohere and overlap with political struggle as ‘the possible overthrow of 
power was not present in all of them … but a good many were able to turn 
themselves to account in overall political struggles and to sometimes even 
lead directly to them’ ( Foucault, 274). This latent revolutionary capacity 
meant that authorities began to take a new view of these activities. In the past 
they may have been tolerated by authorities who were unable or unwilling to 
enforce unpopular laws. However, the post-revolutionary establishment of a 
new regime of bourgeois landed property saw the re-inscription of illegalities 
as ‘delinquencies’ which had to be punished by the new prison regime. 
Intrinsic in this was the fear of a class of people who were thought to be 
criminal as a whole, ‘a barbaric, immoral and outlaw class’ ( Foucault, 1979: 
275).   
 
The work of James Scott describes how widespread illegalities can provide 
the genesis for more organized political resistance. He argues that such 
activities belong to the category of what he calls ‘infrapolitics’ (Scott, 1990: 
183). Infrapolitics function as the everyday practices of resistance by 
subaltern groups which are hidden from the authorities. They provide the 
underpinning of more visible political struggle and are a fundamental 
political force in their own right. As Scott notes: 
 
Poaching and Squatting on a large scale can restructure the control of 
property. Peasant tax evasion on a large scale has brought about crises 
of appropriation that threaten the state. Massive desertion by serf and 
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peasant conscripts has helped bring down more than one ancien 
regime. Under the appropriate conditions the accumulation of petty 
acts can, rather like snowflakes on a steep mountainside, set off an 
avalanche (Scott, 1990: 192). 
 
An additional definitional proviso is provided by Janet Roitman (2006) in her 
work on widespread smuggling and other illegalities in the Chad River Basin. 
Roitman (2006: 249) makes a distinction between illegal and illicit 
behaviour:  
 
more than just an instrumentalist calculation, or a strategy to 
maximize economic gains or personal … [illegalities are] practices 
that while not lawful (hence illegal) are nonetheless not forbidden. 
Illegal activities are rendered licit practice. 
 
In this thesis I use the term ‘illegalities’ as a broad term referring to common 
illegal practices which may have a latent political content. I focus particularly 
on illegal electricity and water connections and on non-payment for services. 
It should be noted that illegalities differ from community to community and 
what may be considered licit in one may very well be seen as shameful in 
another.  
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2.2 Popular Illegalities in South African History 
 
Before exploring the literature regarding the popular illegalities in 
contemporary South Africa it is necessary to look at how apartheid 
illegalities have been interpreted in the literature. Rather than being a 
relatively unimportant epiphenomenon of organized protest, it has been 
argued that widespread evasion and non-payment of state rents and service 
charges played a fundamental role in precipitating many of the major revolts 
and rebellions in South African history. For example, massive non-payment 
of rents in the 19th century Transkei proved a major threat to the colonial 
authorities’ attempts to institute ‘hut taxes’ (Beinart and Bundy, 1987). The 
1906 Zulu rebellion also began as a widespread non-payment of the British 
poll tax (Guy, 2006). Another common tactic of mass illegality was the 
illegal occupation of land in defiance of anti-squatting laws which were 
designed to prevent black people from living in cities. The best known case 
of this was James Mpanza’s establishment of Shantytown near Johannesburg 
in 1944 in direct violation of the law. As black political movements became 
increasingly radicalized after the election of the National Party in 1948, 
illegalities were embraced as a form of militant direct action. The most 
famous example of an organized mass illegality was the 1952 Defiance 
Campaign. This was organized around opposition to the implementation of 
apartheid legislation and involved boycotts, strikes and civil disobedience 
(South African History Online, The 1952 Defiance Campaign). Spearheaded 
by the ANC, the campaign included the burning of pass books as a form of 
non-violent resistance. Although the defiance campaign was a spectacular 
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example of popular illegalities, the increasing oppression of organized dissent 
by the apartheid government meant that such overt boycotts were harder to 
organize. As a result many of the illegalities of the period were hidden in 
order to avoid attracting the unwanted attention of the state. Displays of mass 
popular illegalities would suddenly flare up before seemingly disappearing. 
For example, in 1959 women in rural Natal destroyed cattle-dipping tanks 
and set fire to sugarcane fields due to popular anger about pass books and soil 
conservation laws (Giliomee and Mbenga, 2008: 330). Despite this 
spectacular flaring of popular dissent the perpetrators were caught. 
 
As government repression made organized black political resistance 
increasingly difficult, it is possible that non-payment and evasion may have 
served as an everyday means of keeping resistance alive. In recent history the 
last major episode of organized community resistance and illegalities 
occurred in the township uprisings of the 1980s. Widespread non-payment of 
rates served the dual function of both ruining government revenue and 
undermining its control over townships. In this case the widespread practise 
of illegalities exposed the tenuous hold of the apartheid state; in spite of all 
its power it was unable to collect the most basic service fees in large parts of 
the country which must be considered a massive symbolic defeat. During the 
same period some civic movements encouraged illegal electrical connections 
as means of providing rudimentary services which were not dependent on the 
state, thus creating autonomous spaces of popular control (Freund, 2007). 
There are two further facets of South African history which need to be 
acknowledged. Firstly, the deliberate and insufficient provision of services to 
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black communities has left a space wherein many people have had to resort 
to illegalities as a means of survival. Secondly, a long history of government 
oppression which is still alive in common memory has left a legacy of 
mistrust and subversion of the law. As a result some forms of ‘lawlessness 
[were], from that standpoint a weapon of the weak … in the absence of a 
protective or legitimate state, crime becomes a politics of defiance as much 
as a politics of survival’ ( Posel et al., 2008: 8). 
 
2.3 Literature on Post-Apartheid Popular Illegalities 
 
Popular illegalities are not a new phenomenon in South Africa. My focus 
here, however, is on the literature which deals with post-apartheid illegalities. 
There is a large body of literature produced by activists and academics 
associated with new social movements in which illegalities are regarded as 
being a legitimate response to the perceived failure of government service 
delivery. This literature regards illegalities as being a heroic form of survival 
for the poor who may be unable to afford water and electricity services. For 
example, Ashwin Desai (2002) argues that the continuation of non-payment 
and theft into the post-apartheid years is a direct result of government 
policies which are unfairly skewed against the poor who cannot afford 
services. He suggests that current policies actually force people into criminal 
behaviour: 
 
Currently, large sections of the townships in Durban are being pushed 
into the popular illegalities of clandestine water reconnections…. 
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What has been conspicuous by its absence from the (Durban) 
Council’s response to the water crisis is the arrest on charges of 
malicious injury to property and/or theft of even one individual for an 
unauthorized reconnection. There is no shortage of incidents or 
evidence of reconnections. Struggle plumbers abound. Indeed, when 
Manqele [a court case] was argued, the [Durban] Metro Council 
submitted videotapes to the court showing people who it identified, 
reconnecting water. Instead, the Council’s modus operandi is to send 
in small armies to re-disconnect, prompting, predictably a dis-re-
disconnection as soon as the troops leave. The Durban Metro is thus 
creating mass lawlessness by the sheer scale of its acts of oppression, 
which are bound to breed resistance (Desai, 2002: 75). 
 
In a later article Desai argues that these illegalities may form part of a long-
term strategy for winning concessions from the state:  
 
The metropolitan militant who does not pay for water and electricity, 
who squats and occupies and tries his luck, often succeeds in 
snatching income from the state and protects this income in collective 
struggle when the state or parastatals attempt to reclaim it. In certain 
rural areas, stock theft, squatting and slow, semi-legal land 
occupations under the guise of land tenancy, perform the same 
function (Desai, 2003). 
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The claim that these illegalities are a necessary survival strategy for the poor 
is also echoed in a study of the socio-economic conditions of the Bayview 
area in Durban (Pillay et al., 2005). According to the research, a high rate of 
disconnections for non-payment has resulted in a proliferation of illegal water 
and electricity connections, which the community no longer regards as being 
illegal. 
 
There has also been a fair amount of literature on the usage of illegal 
reconnections by movements such as the Soweto Electricity Crisis 
Committee (SECC), which encouraged illegal access with their Operation 
Khanyisa (meaning ‘light’) in which its activists reconnected houses which 
had been cut off for non-payment. It has been argued that these illegalities 
were part of a wider struggle against the privatization and commodification 
of resources. According to Ngwane and Veriva (2004:142), illegalities are a 
tactic which ‘attempts to reverse the logic of neo-liberalism by limiting the 
power of the market over people’s lives’. As Egan and Wafer (2006) point 
out, the SECC has argued that these reconnections are not criminal acts but 
rather legitimate resistance. These reconnections are primarily aimed at 
winning material benefits for Soweto residents who have had their services 
removed. Members articulate their concerns as ‘immediate and material, 
related to their daily lives rather than abstract ideas about privatization and 
globalization’ (Egan and Wafer, 2004: 18). The SECC put in place structures 
where residents could directly register for reconnection, and claimed that 
connectors could reconnect as many as 12 households in one day (Ndletyana, 
2007: 100). Connectors would also remove pre-paid water meters so that 
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households could use water without being billed. The reconnections were 
done in plain view of the public and often took on a highly theatrical element 
or, as one reconnecter described it, ‘you learn not to do it in the dark … 
everybody must see who was there ... Don’t hide yourself’ (Egan and Wafer, 
2006: 100). This spectacular form of protest also took on other forms. In one 
case protesters forced their way into the house of Johannesburg mayor, Amos 
Masondo, cut off its electricity supply and threw litter all over the premise 
(Ndletyana, 2007: 100). This spectacular usage of illegalities was clearly 
meant as an inversion of the established order. Not only was the mayor 
forced to experience the inconvenience and deprivation of disconnection but 
it visibly challenged the state’s monopoly on control of services, albeit in a 
highly theatrical and transitory manner. As argued above such spectacular 
flouting of the law through the embrace of illegalities has a long pedigree in 
South Africa. By using such provocative techniques the SECC was 
symbolically aligning themselves with these past struggles, giving their 
projects the same patina of moral legitimacy as, say, the anti-apartheid 
Defiance Campaign. These provocations and tactics were not popular with all 
Soweto residents, as more well-off residents who could afford to pay for 
services were afraid of trouble with the authorities or the inconvenience of 
the temporary power loss caused during reconnections. 
 
The Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign (AEC) which was formed in 
2000 has also used illegal reconnections. Miraftab argues that this is used 
alongside legal techniques, such as challenging munciapalities in court to 
prevent evictions: 
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While some AEC activties such as reconnections and resitance to evictions 
have a different redistributive goal, its work also aims at recognition of poor 
residents plight, their histories  
At the same time it is likely that most illegalities have no connection to social 
movements. Nevertheless, affordable services for all are ‘symbolic of what it 
means to have dispensed with apartheid’ and so are intrinsically politicized 
(Egan and Wafer, 2004: 18). Thus, while most illegalities function without 
any linkages to social movements, this does not mean that they have no 
political significance: it has been suggested that they may been considered as 
possibly representing a form of silent boycott (Ruiters, 2006). Chance (2006) 
takes this further and argues that government focus on combating non-
payment and illegal access ignores the legitimate grievances which underpin 
such practices. This serves to de-politicize illegalities: what was seen as a 
form of noble resistance to the state under apartheid is now perceived as a 
threat which undermines the advances brought by democracy. In an argument 
that is similar to Foucault’s (1979) she maintains that while illegalities were 
regarded as being a collective technique of struggle under apartheid they are 
now being treated by the democratically elected government as individual 
acts of delinquency. The usage of illegal access as a legitimate tactic has been 
deeply contested by government. For example, in Jeff Radebe’s (2001) 
aforementioned speech about illegalities he presents them as being the work 
of opportunistic, anti-government forces, clearly referring to groups like the 
SECC. Through describing such tactics as inherently criminal, government 
denies the legitimacy of the SECC and other social movements who have 
encouraged illegal access. The relationship between government and the 
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more militant, action-orientated community groups has been fraught with 
tension, with many activists accusing the state of using apartheid-style police 
brutality and intimidation to quell protest. Cock (2006: 220) suggests that 
what is at stake is not just the government’s monopoly over service provision 
but its claim to be the arbiter of modernity: in the case of pre-paid water 
meters these are pitched as a ‘modern, post-apartheid development enabling 
consumers to exercise choice’. In such a context illegalities could be regarded 
as an atavistic hangover from the struggle against apartheid. While legitimate 
and necessary in the chaotic 1980s, they now present a threat to attempts to 
create disciplined, modern citizens who comply with their payment 
obligations. 
 
2.4 Illegalities as a Creative Force in Contemporary Africa  
 
Illegalities are seen as an everyday part of life in many parts of modern urban 
Africa. Official service delivery in Africa is limited by two main factors: 
diminished government capacity and funding and massive, continual 
urbanization. In such environments people are forced to resort to radical 
forms of self-help, such as illegal connections as a means of securing access 
to water, electricity and other resources. In a study of inner-city 
Johannesburg, Abdou Maliq Simone (2006) argues that this leads citizens to 
invent new and innovative means of existing within cities. Illegalities do not 
just function as a survival technique but may ‘give rise to unexpected ways of 
intervening in urban space’ (Simone, 2006: 246). Illegalities may therefore be 
a blessing in disguise, a kind of rapid, informal urban development which 
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provides entirely new ways of supplying and manipulating resources As 
Simone (2006: 246 ) adds: 
 
Whatever their legal nature, however fraudulent the intent, the 
remarkable proliferation of scams and schemes of all kinds across 
urban South Africa not only points to the desperation of people 
looking for employment and places to live but the capacity of 
residents to converge in all kinds of combinations and generate 
money on the basis of almost nothing. Though I am not encouraging 
the elaboration of such illegality per se, it does point to how 
generative other kinds of experimentations with minimal 
technological investment could be in converging different kinds of 
actors under a variety of circumstances. 
 
Illegalities may also function in the long term as part of a process which 
Bayat (2000) calls ‘quiet encroachment’ in which the urban poor engage in 
various survival techniques at the expense of elites in order to gain a 
substantive material foothold in the city (see also Pieterse, 2005). As Bayat 
(2000: 24-25) describes this process making explicit reference to illegal 
connections: 
 
While quiet encroachment is basically a non-movement, it is distinct 
from survival strategies or ‘everyday resistance’. First, the struggles 
and gains of people at the grassroots are not made at the expense of 
fellow poor or themselves, but off the state, the rich and the general 
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public. For example in order to light their shelters, the urban poor tap 
electricity not from their neighbours, but from the municipality power 
pole … This kind of quiet activism challenges fundamental aspects of 
state prerogatives, including the meaning of ‘order’ and control of 
public space. But the most immediate consequence is the 
redistribution of social goods via the (unlawful and direct) acquisition 
of collective consumption (land, shelter, piped water, electricity); 
public space (streets, intersections, parking areas); and opportunities 
(favourable business conditions, locations and labels). 
 
As Edgar Pieterse (2005: 162) notes, such activities exist in a space between 
direct action and grassroots development and function as a creative series of 
everyday practices for living in the city. Basile Ndjio (2006: 116) takes this 
creativity approach further by arguing that the everyday citizen who has to 
use a mix of legal and illegal techniques to survive is a modern hero, a 
creative figure who by stratagems of resourcefulness, trickery and 
circumvention is able to invent new forms of urban life. While much of the 
focus on the mutational and transformative capacity of illegalities has 
focused on the city, Fantu Cheru (2005) makes the same claims for the 
illegalities practised in Africa’s rural environments. In a study of the 
Ethiopian peasantry he argues that illegalities are often ingenious and 
reflective of latent peasant capacity to adjust to harsh material conditions 
(Cheru, 2005: 77). In the light of the state’s inability to provide services to its 
citizenry he argues that such survival strategies are a positive force: 
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Although the driving force for self-help and improvisation is survival, 
the millions of poor Africans operating outside of the official market 
are in fact providing vital services where governments have failed to 
carry out their responsibilities. Instead of castigating the poor and 
characterising their professions as ‘criminal’ or ‘illegal’ we should 
celebrate them for elevating the human spirit, for fighting to preserve 
their dignity (Cheru, 2005: 78). 
 
This work has its spiritual ascendant in Frantz Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth 
(2001[1961]). Fanon argued that rather than being passive victims of poverty, 
urban Africans are a revolutionary force in their inherent ability to generate 
new ways of being under adverse conditions and to overwhelm the power of 
the state. Writing against the backdrop of the fall of colonialism he wrote 
that: 
 
The constitution of the lumpen-proletariat is a phenomenon which 
obeys its own logic, and neither the brimming activity of the 
missionaries nor the decrees of the central government can check its 
growth. This lumpen- proletariat is like a horde of rats; you may kick 
them and throw stones at them, but despite your efforts they’ll go on 
gnawing at the roots of the tree (Fanon, 2001: 103). 
 
2.5 Literature on Historical Illegalities  
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There is a large body of generally Marxist historiography which deals with 
popular illegalities as form of resistance to the establishment of modern 
capitalism in Europe (see for example Hay et al., 1975; Hobsbawm, 1959; 
Thompson, 1968; and Winslow, 1975). Thompson (1968) argues that rather 
than just being acts of theft, illegalities were underpinned by a traditional 
‘moral economy’ which was opposed to the enclosure of public lands and the 
introduction of new rents. Furthermore, this moral economy was based on the 
belief in a just price for goods and services for the poor. When these values 
were threatened by the new commodity relations of emergent industrial 
capitalism, large sections of the poor felt that they had the right to engage in 
poaching, smuggling and other practices. Winslow (1975) observes that such 
activities were tolerated because they created tangible material benefits for 
poor communities with, for instance, smuggling allowing for the wider 
availability of expensive goods such as tea and spirits. These illegalities were 
successful because they were governed by social rules. As Hay  (1975: 207-
208) point out in the case of poaching: ‘the judicial definition of theft did not 
coincide, of course, with the popular definition … [Acceptable illegal] 
practices were rigidly defined by custom, and the goods involved were 
sharply distinguished from other property’. 
 
The study of historical illegalities also shows how they can form the genesis 
for more organized forms of political resistance. Marx argued that the mass 
appropriation of forest goods by the German peasantry in the 1840s showed 
an adherence to communal feudal customs which were resistant to the 
introduction of a new property regime (Linebaugh, 1976). Thompson 
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suggests that the machine-smashing antics of the Luddites preceded the 
establishment of more organized working class resistance such as the 
Charterists (Thompson, 1968). All this literature demonstrates how 
illegalities can serve as an important barometer of the issues around which 
later political resistance will mobilize. More recently, historians have focused 
on how the practise of illegalities can in itself serve as an alternative model of 
governance. In a study of medieval Europe, Silvia Federici (2004: 27) argues 
that illegalities were often  
 
conscious forms of social transgression … [which] constituted a 
powerful alternative not only to feudalism but to the capitalist order 
by which feudalism was replaced, demonstrating that another world 
was possible, and urging us to question why this was not realized.  
 
Linebaugh and Rediker (2001) hold the same for many of the pirate ships of 
the Atlantic. These multiracial crews supported themselves through plunder 
and other illegal activities but they were often organized along deeply 
democratic lines which, it is suggested, may prove to be a compelling 
alternative model for contemporary societies. 
 
2.6 Popular Illegalities as Resistance, Local Knowledge and 
Development from Below 
 
There is also a large body of work by developmental writers and 
anthropologists which celebrates illegalities as a form of both resistance and 
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grassroots development by the poor. One of the key theorists in this is the 
aforementioned Scott, whose work has provided a thorough typology of 
everyday forms of resistance (1985; 1990 and 1998). In his book Weapons of 
the Weak (1985) he details the anonymous resistance practised by Malaysian 
peasants against landowners. These illegalities included destruction of 
farming equipment, petty theft and the killing of livestock. This served the 
dual role of both resistance and of gaining material benefits: 
 
We need assume no more than an understandable desire on the part of 
the peasant household to survive – to ensure its physical safety, to 
ensure its food supply, to ensure its necessary cash income – to 
identify the source of resistance to the claims of press gangs, tax 
collectors, landlords and employers … It is precisely the fusion of 
self-interest and resistance that is the vital force animating the 
resistance of peasants and proletarians. When a peasant hides part of 
his crop to avoid paying taxes, he is both filling his stomach and 
depriving the state of grain (Scott, 1985: 295). 
 
Illegalities function as a direct form of self-help and the forms they take are 
dependent on the material conditions of the communities in which they are 
practised. Scott maintains that illegalities also have a symbolic component: 
by attacking a tractor peasants were also attacking an icon of the 
modernization which threatened their traditional way of life. These 
illegalities are successful as resistance precisely because they are performed 
anonymously and persistently. This allows the perpetrators to avoid direct 
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confrontation with the authorities. As developed in his later concept of 
infrapolitics, widespread illegalities can ultimately thwart the ambitions of 
the state. These tactics of winning concessions through trickery and evasion 
are also represented in the world’s folklore. Scott argues that trickster 
archetypes, such as Reynard the Fox of medieval France and Brer Rabbit of 
the North American slaves, celebrate the poor’s ability to evade and 
undermine authorities through guile and ingenuity (Scott, 1990: 163). 
(Perhaps a pertinent archetype for illegal electrical connections would be the 
Greek Titan, Prometheus, who stole fire from the gods to help struggling 
humanity, only to be punished for his troubles). In his most recent work, 
Seeing Like a State (1998), Scott argues that development initiatives are 
underpinned by a belief in ‘authoritarian high modernism’ which 
marginalizes the poor and their own local knowledge of their environment by 
regarding them as powerless subjects who need to be saved from their 
‘backwardness’ through technological interventions. Illegalities may 
therefore be a technique of reasserting this local knowledge and techniques of 
self-development. For instance, the collectivist Ujamaa farm policies of 
Tanzania were undermined by ‘foot dragging, by privatising work and land 
that had been appropriated by the state, by evasion, by flight and by raiding 
government programs’ (Scott, 1985: 302-303). In such a scenario illegalities 
were used to both reassert traditional practices while undermining unpopular 
new ones. 
 
Scott’s themes have been developed by others. James Ferguson (1990) also 
argues that anonymous illegalities can function as a direct form of resistance 
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to unpopular development initiatives. In the case of Lesotho, government 
woodlots development programs were derailed by problems such as the 
breaking of fences by local famers to allow their livestock to graze. He 
argues that these woodlot programs were unpopular because the land used 
was taken from its previous owners without compensation and deprived 
farmers of their traditional tenure rights. The destruction of the woodlots  
 
presented an easy target for those who wished to attack the 
government and the symbols of its presence in Thaba-Tseka … the 
vandalization of the woodlots must be placed in the larger context of 
political resistance to the Government in general, and the 
‘development’ intervention in particular (Ferguson, 1990: 247).  
 
Arturo Escobar (1995) takes a similar anti-developmental line to Scott in 
arguing that development initiatives often ignore local knowledge which 
leads to illegalities which are aimed at protecting livelihoods and cultural 
values. Through these illegalities, people seek to sustain a ‘livelihood 
economy’ which is concerned with the satisfaction of qualitative needs rather 
than commodity production. Illegalities may serve to create a ‘black 
economy’ of clandestine exchanges which serves the dual function of 
meeting basic needs while ‘seeking to counteract the imposition of 
commodity production on customary ways’ (Escobar, 1995:168). Rather than 
being an atavistic reaction to development, such illegalities may be a means 
of preserving economic and cultural values within the constraints of the 
modern world. 
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2.7 Illegalities and the Global Economy  
 
Although governments worldwide are now moving away from uncritical 
adoption of neoliberal service delivery polices, it has been argued that the 
dominance of market-orientated thinking over the last few decades has lead 
to a significant rise in global illegalities. As Graham and Marvin (2001) 
argue, neoliberalism has lead to an international pattern of ‘splintering 
urbanism’, a dual process where services become increasingly expensive 
concurrent with less spending on public services. This leads the wealthy to 
rely on privatized services while poor people are increasingly forced to pay 
higher charges for services (Caldeira, 2000; Davis, 1990). This problem is 
compounded by the largest wave of urbanization in human history with 
millions of people moving into cities which already have terminally 
overstretched infrastructure (UN Habitat, 2003; Davis, 2006). Reliable 
electricity and water service provision is also threatened by global warming 
and ecological degradation. In such conditions increasing numbers of illegal 
connections to water and electricity are to be expected. At the same time the 
very techniques which are used to ensure payment may ironically also lead to 
more attempts at illegal access. Mark Drakeford (1998: 295) suggests that in 
the case of pre-paid water meters which are intended to ensure payment, the 
opposite obtains as users who cannot pay self-disconnect. In such cases, users 
may tamper with devices in order to renew services.  
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It has also been argued that an increasing reliance on market-based policies 
may also contribute towards illegalities. British sociologists have argued that 
the use of marketized incentives in shaping citizens behaviour may be based 
upon flawed assumptions of human behaviour. Taylor-Gooby (2000:13) 
suggests that an ‘intrinsic shift in the direction of market mechanisms may 
weaken altruism, stifle intrinsic motivations and exhaust citizenship, with the 
result that public services decline in efficiency’. Such an erosion of public 
service may also erode citizens’ willingness to meet their payment 
requirements and may encourage a hostile attitude towards the state. 
Furthermore, this erosion of public goods may lead to a nihilistic attitude of 
attempting to gain as many free material benefits as possible, which could 
serve to justify pilferage and non-payment (Gray, 1998; Sennet, 1998). The 
writer Eduardo Galeano (2000) takes this critique further and maintains that 
under criminally acquisitive capitalism illegal behaviour is replicated through 
all strata of society, making the control and censure of illegalities almost 
impossible. 
 
Manuel Castells (1998: 162) argues further that widespread illegality is 
encouraged by the creation of ‘black holes of informational capitalism’ – 
deprived areas which are surplus to the needs of global capital such as 
squatter camps and inner city slums. Because such areas are excluded they 
become linked to criminal economies. Castells focuses on organized crime, 
like drugs and prostitution, but it is apparent that in such ‘black holes’ the 
lack of official infrastructure may make illegalities common practice. 
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Furthermore, it is difficult to distinguish between legal and illegal economic 
activities. The interlinked nature of a globalized economy means that illicit 
practices in one part of the world may be an important component of licit 
activity in another. For example, it has been argued that the global increase in 
copper theft from municipal infrastructures is being fuelled by the demand 
for building materials in the fast- industrialising economies of Brazil, India 
and China (Edemariam, 2008). Describing the difficulty in drawing clear 
lines between legal and illegal activities, Carolyn Nordstrom (2007: 89) says: 
 
Business is done in the flow of il/legalities. They are so basic to 
commerce that only the smallest percentage is captured by law … the 
unregulated is intrinsically interwoven into formal business in a way 
that judicial systems can’t easily separate. Even determining where 
the lines of il/licit can or should be drawn is a judicial challenge. To 
attack certain fonts of unregulated trade would be to attack some 
fronts of the economy in general.  
 
2.8  Illegalities and the Subversion of Urban Space 
 
There is a large body of European literature which looks at the tactics citizens 
use to win control over urban space. While much of this does not focus on 
illegalities per se, this work employs several useful concepts which may add 
to an understanding of the motivations and potential consequences of popular 
illegalities. A key concept is Lefebvre’s ‘right to the city’ which entails the 
right to ‘urban life, to renewed centrality, to places of encounter and 
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exchange, to life rhythms and time uses, enabling the full and complete usage 
of … moments and places’ (Lefebvre, 1996: 158). He imagined this as a 
radical rewriting of how urban space is used, in which the practical actions of 
everyday life would ultimately transfer control of the city from capital and 
the state to the inhabitants (Gandy, 2006: 257). It is possible to regard 
illegalities as one means of winning this control through providing direct 
links to resources which may otherwise be out of the reach of some citizens. 
A similar approach is taken in Castells’ work on the composition and aims of 
urban social movements (Castells, 1978; 1983). Castells argues that these 
movements have a particular focus on issues of collective consumption such 
as access to public service. The primary political focus is on provision and 
access to services and on ensuring access for all urban citizens (Tonkiss, 
2005). This particular focus on winning substantive material accesses, as 
opposed to just political representation, may go some way in explaining why 
post-apartheid social movements have used illegalities as a form of direct 
action. The work of Michel De Certeau  looks at how the anonymous 
practices of everyday city life allow citizens to reassert their dominance of 
urban space through ‘tactics’ which allow for a sense of individuality in the 
over determined modern city. Such innocuous practices as taking ones own 
routes through the city even though they may not be the quickest or most 
‘rational’ embody the potential of the ‘prosaic practitioner of urban space’ to 
defeat the city’s’ control of individual time and movement (De Certeau, 
1984: 31). These everyday practices allow for control of one’s time and 
surroundings which De Certeau sees as an everyday weapon of the weak. 
This entails the potential for the collective ‘process of appropriation of the 
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topographical system’ in which urban dwellers slowly carve out their own 
space of control over their environments.  
 
This provides an interesting perspective with which to look at illegal 
connections which are often hidden as a matter of necessity. Is it possible that 
these connections are not only giving users control over their environments 
but are also slowly enacting a new urban regime and creating a covert form 
of service delivery which is hidden from the authorities? In fact the 
exponential usage of illegalities can actually reconfigure urban space in a far 
more overt way as authorities are forced into recognising them as legitimate 
practice. The American journalist Robert Neuwirth (2004) observed this 
process at work in the Brazilian favela (slum), Rochina, where the 
widespread use of illegal connections was ultimately formalized by the state: 
 
As the community devolved, the residents were emboldened by their 
numbers they seized services the same way they seized land. Gatos – 
which literally means cats but is Brazilian argot for people who pirate 
public services – run wires to tap into the electric grid. For years, 
Rocinha was festooned with curving strands of lamp wire bringing a 
feeble current to each house. Today the power company has 
recognised that Rochina is not 150 000 thieves but 150 000 potential 
customers, and has embarked on a plan to provide legal electricity in 
the favela, provided residents agree to install a meter ... Today there’s 
only one throwback to the days of the Gatos: almost every streetlight 
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or electric pole in Rochina still has illegal wires tapping into it 
(Neuwirth, 2004: 41).  
 
This exponential quality of illegalities, their latent tendency to overthrow and 
disrupt the accepted order and logic of commodity exchange has also been 
celebrated by several anti-capitalist groups as being a direct form of 
resistance. The underlying idea is that widespread use of illegalities stealthily 
chips away at the edifices of the capitalist state and exposes the transitory 
nature of the commodity economy. In the 1960s, the French Situationist 
International (SI) encouraged such illegal activities as work sabotage and 
stoppages, outright theft and wildcat strikes as a means of challenging 
capitalist control of workers space and time (Juno and Vale, 1987; Home 
1996). The Italian Autonomists of the 1970s also encouraged mass 
illegalities; indeed, practices such as the unilateral reduction of bills and 
workplace sabotage, appear to have been widespread at the time (Power, 
2008: 52). Such activity is reminiscent of Thompson’s (1968) concept of a 
moral economy and the belief that there is nothing wrong in paying only 
what one can afford for service if one pays at all.  
 
While the idea that such illegalities could hasten the end of capitalism may 
seem naively utopian, recent history has shown that mass illegalities can in 
fact reconfigure accepted ideas of economic change. I am thinking here of the 
mass practice of internet piracy of films, music, TV shows and computer 
games. The ubiquity of this practice over the last decade has undermined the 
traditional entertainment industry and has forced it to make radical 
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concessions in the way it conducts business. Many people now feel no 
obligation to pay for much of the entertainment they consume. It has been 
suggested that such a process could have far larger implications and could 
even reinvigorate public service through encouraging the belief that utilities 
should be free: 
 
Learning to get something for nothing (even if it’s not anything, in the 
end, for now) is exactly the mentality that we’d be best served to 
foster. The web makes it easy, but perhaps it might best be visualized 
as what they called a “gateway drug” when I was a kid. (I don’t know 
if the phrase is still current - but the idea was that the true danger of 
pot, in its happy non-dangerousness, was that it readied kids to try 
more dangerous, destructive “hard” drugs). It’s not a long leap from 
free and well-designed email to free and smoothly working public 
wifi. And from public wifi, it’s a longer leap, though not all that long, 
to nationalized health care. A bit further yet to media, housing stock, 
and all the rest. After all, who today would pay for an email account? 
(Adswithoutproducts.com, 11 August 2008)  
 
2.9 The Dangers of Popular Illegalities  
 
The literature discussed so far has been sympathetic to the practice of popular 
illegalities. However, illegalities have also been regarded as a malignant 
criminal threat to the stability of the state and to public order in general. 
Thomas Smith (2004: 2067) writes that the theft of electrical services is an 
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international problem which results in ‘lost earnings, shortage of funds for 
investment in power system capacity and improvement and a necessity to 
expand generating capacity to cope with the power losses. Some power 
systems in worst affected countries are near bankrupt’. The biggest threat is 
that if such practices become institutionalized they can lead to a degradation 
of infrastructure, unreliable delivery and increased electricity charges. Smith 
also notes that such pilferage often takes place with the collusion of 
government employees and is reflective of high levels of graft and corruption 
in these organizations. If systematized, such practices could help to bring 
about state collapse. The close linkage between failed power systems and 
failed states has been explored by Nigerian writers. Olukoju ( 2002) argues 
that electricity theft is endemic is his home country, but blames this more on 
the corruption and incompetence of the National Electric Power Authority 
(NEPA) than on delinquent consumers. However, he notes that NEPA’s 
incomopetence is further compounded by the widespread theft of cables and 
other equipment, which may also be the work of corrupt officials (Olukoju, 
2002: 56). As a result, Nigerians are constantly plagued by blackouts which 
often result in violent confrontations with NEPA workers. Osaghae (1999) 
argues that the widespread corruption and inefficiency of the Nigerian 
government has pushed many citizens to exit into parallel economic networks 
to meet their needs. He defines this survival strategy as a form of ‘exit from 
the polity’ which entails  
 
bypassing or avoiding the organized civil order without necessarily 
disconnecting from the state. Such qualified exit which is more 
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prevalent among the ordinary people, for whom exit is a matter of 
survival, results from the fact that however much they try to avoid the 
state those organizing the parallel systems continually need the state 
in one way or another (Osaghae, 1999: 83).  
 
For example, people may still need the collusion of officials to establish 
illegal access to services. Osaghae (1999:84) distinguishes this socio-
economic exit from ‘exit from the state’, a more explicitly political practice 
which may entail secession and violent confrontation with the state. 
Nonetheless exit from the polity has its own dangers as it can undermine the 
state’s ability to collect revenue and paralyses service delivery. At the same 
time the state may tolerate this kind of exit as it provides services which the 
state cannot: ‘the activities of such exit groups have helped to mitigate the 
shortcomings of the state and prevent the deepening of its legitimacy crisis 
and consequently a cycle of confrontation within it’ (Osaghae, 1999: 96). 
Treating illegalities with benign neglect may help to prolong the survival of 
inefficient and corrupt regimes. 
 
When looking at examples of states which have faced infrastructure collapse 
due to massive theft it is instructive to note that this may be due to factors 
other than small-scale popular illegalities. In many cases it may be due to the 
illegal behaviour of the elite. For example, post-communist Russia saw the 
privatization of its formerly state-owned energy sector. This process was 
marred by corruption in which state officials, businessmen and criminal 
gangs colluded to seize the energy sector for their own gain (Volkov, 2002). 
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This had disastrous consequences for the Russian people: in the city of 
Vladivostok electricity distribution almost came to a halt due to massive 
corruption and pillaging by state officials working with gangs (Satter, 2003). 
Russia has also seen wide-scale illegal connections by officials and business 
executives, with one official saying: ‘electricity theft is quite widespread 
across the country. The poorest people steal electricity for obvious reasons 
while the wealthy do it because their multi-storey villa with obvious gadgets 
eat up a lot power’ (The Moscow Times, 30 April 2008, my emphasis). In 
post-war Iraq entire provinces have disconnected from the national grid as 
they claim that they are unable to meet their regional electricity needs (The 
Seattle Times, 5 August 2007). While post-war looting of infrastructure has 
contributed to these shortages, this is merely part of the problem. More 
significant factors include sanctions under the rule of Saddam Hussein, 
bombing during the war and the general failure of the American-led post-war 
reconstruction (Danner, 2004; Herring and Rangwala, 2006; Miller, 2006). It 
is an additional point of interest that the occupation’s failure to restore water 
and lights in the post-invasion period caused massive resentment amongst the 
Iraqi people and helped to fuel the nascent insurgency (Shadid, 2006).  
 
Perhaps the most spectacular example of wide-scale criminality undermining 
electrical distribution was Enron’s role in the California power crisis of 
2000/2001. In an attempt to force the state to deregulate its power sector the 
now-defunct corporation, with the tacit approval of the Bush administration, 
deliberately turned off some of its power stations with the aim of 
exacerbating the rolling blackouts the state was undergoing at the time 
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(Guardian, 5 February 2005). What these examples show is that it is often 
the illegal actions of the elite which destroys infrastructure. Small-scale 
popular illegalities affect the state’s ability to collect revenue but it seems 
doubtful than in or of themselves they have the potential to collapse entire 
infrastructural networks, or governments, for that matter. 
 
 
 
 
2.10  Conclusion 
 
This survey of literature on historical and contemporary popular illegalities 
reveals that scholars have generally viewed the practise as a positive 
phenomenon. This appears to be for two key reasons. Firstly they serve as an 
expression of popular discontent. In the case of oppressive political regimes 
where organised resistance is limited, wide scale illegalities may in fact serve 
as one of the major pivots of resistance. Secondly the material benefits of 
illegalities are seen as empowering for the poor and marginalised. While this 
practise directly benefits those who are engaged in it, the inherent subversion 
of private property, state power and urban order may also have significant 
ramifications for society as a whole. Rather than viewing illegalities as a 
problem of policing, much of the literature reviewed sees illegal access as a 
legitimate, even heroic practise. In order to provide a contrast to such 
literature, I also reviewed literature which views popular illegalities as a 
dangerous phenomenon which undermines the ability of the state to fund and 
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deliver services. However, it appears that where the state is undermined, this 
is often the consequence of elite corruption and delinquency rather than of 
the kinds of illegal access practiced by the poor.  
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Chapter Three:  Popular Illegalities in Post-Apartheid South 
Africa 
 
The theft and non-payment of municipal services is a widespread problem in 
post-apartheid South Africa. As local authorities rely on utility fees to finance 
their operations, reduced revenue collection may have a negative effect on 
their ability to deliver affordable water and electricity.  
 
3.1  The Scale of Popular Illegalities in the Electricity Sector 
 
Electricity in South Africa is provided by Eskom, a state-owned utility, or by 
municipal providers who buy electricity from Eskom. There are three main 
types of electricity theft in South Africa: non-payment by legally connected 
users; illegal connections to the grid, in particular illegal connections directly 
to service cables; and finally, the theft and destruction of electrical 
infrastructure, which is often related to cable theft for copper wiring.  
 
There have been several attempts to determine exactly how much revenue is 
lost through non-payment and illegal connections, but technical and 
administrative factors make it difficult to determine accurate figures. Rens 
Bindeman, an engineer from SARPA (South African Revenue Protection 
Association), explains that determining the actual revenue losses from theft 
and non-payment is difficult because there are so many service providers in 
the country, many of whom do not keep systematic records of revenue loss 
(Bindeman, 2008). The National Electricity Regulator attempted to create a 
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national record, but this failed because many service providers failed to 
supply figures. The distribution crisis which affected Eskom in 2008 has also 
put illegal access under the spotlight, as it has been seen as a significant 
contributing factor to the utility’s problems. Independent electrical engineer 
Chris Yelland (2008) has been vocal in blaming illegal connections for 
Eskom’s distribution problems, estimating that together Eskom and 
municipal distributors lose around 12 934 GWh of electricity per annum. He 
further estimates that electricity lost as a result of theft, fraud, the bypassing 
of meters and the stealing of infrastructure amounts to lost revenue of 
R5.34 billion per annum. It must be stressed that all these figures are 
informed estimates and are open to challenge. 
  
3.2  The Extent of Popular Illegalities in the Water Sector 
 
Water distribution in South Africa is organized in three different tiers. The 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) sets policy, Water 
Boards are responsible for providing bulk water, and municipalities 
administer the distribution and billing of water services. Service providers 
recognize two major forms of theft in the water sector. This includes the non-
payment of bills by authorized consumers, and illegal connections to 
residential taps or public standpipes.  
 
As with electricity, determining the amount of water revenue loss is difficult. 
This is compounded by natural factors such as evaporation. Again there have 
been attempts to systematically work out how much water revenue is lost 
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through non-payment and illegal connections. According to a government 
estimate annual national water revenue loss is approximately 30% of the total 
average demand (National Assembly, Internal Question Paper 14 June 2002). 
This estimate includes physical water loss as well as billing and meter losses 
and water theft through illegal and unrecorded connections. It is practically 
impossible to achieve 0% unaccounted for water due to natural factors like 
evaporation, so a widely used benchmark for an acceptable level of loss is 
15%. The remaining 15% can then, in theory, be recovered through reducing 
the level of unbilled access. According to DWAF over 600 billion litres a 
year is lost as a result of leaks, inaccurate meters, non-payment and theft 
(News24, 15 February 2007). Based on this figure the total cost of non-
revenue water annually is R3.259 billion a year.  
 
It should be stressed that in both the water and electricity sectors it is 
impossible to work out exactly how much water and electricity is lost due to 
illegal connections. It may be possible that in some cases figures are 
exaggerated by government to justify harsh punitive measures against people 
engaged in illegalities. It also provides an easy target for blame when there 
are distribution problems. Yelland (2008), for example, claims that illegal 
access is a major factor in Eskom’s recent distribution problems, but pays 
little attention to the effects of wasteful usage by industry and wealthy users. 
As a result the extent of the losses claimed by government, municipalities 
and other commentators is always open to question.  
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3.3  Historical Context 
 
Under the apartheid-era National Party government, electricity and water 
distribution was radically skewed, as cheap, subsidized services were 
provided to white residential areas and business, while African, Indian and 
coloured areas were deliberately undeveloped. White industry particularly 
benefited from this subsidization, with service charges for industry being 
among the cheapest in the world at the time. This has left a legacy of 
infrastructural underdevelopment, as for many years millions of South 
Africans were denied basic water and electricity services (Terreblanche, 
2002). This radical inequality made municipal services a target for resistance 
to the apartheid state. Rent and service boycotts were used by groups such as 
the United Democratic Front (UDF) as a way of protesting against both 
government oppression and the local authorities and councillors who 
represented the state (Seekings, 1999). Millions of South Africans stopped 
paying for services and rates during these rent boycotts. These boycotts were 
a major fiscal worry for the apartheid government: an estimate from 1988 
holds that the rent boycott in Soweto alone lost the government $400m in 
revenue in a 20-month period (New York Times, 22 February 1988). Despite 
these boycotts, the state often continued to provide services in an attempt to 
quell the political fallout from cut-offs, which as David McDonald notes, 
resulted in ‘a de facto subsidization of township services’ (McDonald, 2002: 
20). These boycotts were intended to directly undermine the government 
through making large parts of the country ungovernable. However, it has also 
been argued that they have created a culture of non-payment in which 
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residential users do not feel that they should have to pay for services 
(Johnson, 1999).  
 
3.4  The Post-Apartheid Government and Cost Recovery 
 
When the first democratically elected government took office in 1994, they 
were thus confronted with a legacy of inadequate service delivery, in which 
millions of South African had little or greatly restricted access to basic 
services such as water and electricity. This was compounded by the problem 
of widespread non-payment of services. Government’s service delivery 
policies have been greatly influenced by the international adoption of 
neoliberal economic policies which aim at reduced government expenditure 
and an expanded role for the private sector. This global policy shift was 
precipitated by the collapse of the Soviet Union, which undermined notions 
of state ownership and central planning (Greenberg, 2006: 162). The 
increasing integration of the global economy also influenced the decision to 
adopt neoliberal economic policies, as it was hoped that such policies would 
help attract foreign capital investment which could be used to support the 
reconstruction of South Africa (Koelble, 1998). Although government argued 
that these policies were necessary to ensure economic stability and attract 
foreign investment, these polices have been harshly criticized by the left. 
Many commentators have seen this policy decision as a betrayal of 
government’s promises of redistribution and have argued that neoliberal 
economic policies have further disenfranchised the poor, effectively 
replacing racial with class apartheid (Bond, 2004; 2005; Gumede, 2005). 
 43 
While it is not within the remit of the thesis to engage extensively with these 
criticisms, in this section I will briefly elucidate how some of these 
arguments have been applied to the provision of services. 
 
In terms of service delivery, South Africa’s economic framework has led to 
the adoption of cost recovery methods which entail the ‘practice of charging 
consumers the full (or nearly full) cost of providing services such as water 
and electricity’ (McDonald, 2002: 18). McDonald (2002: 18) further argues 
that for services which can be measured in volumetric terms such as water 
and electricity: 
 
Cost recovery is achieved by charging end-users the (full) short-run 
marginal cost of production plus a portion of long-term operating and 
maintenance costs. To illustrate, if a person wanted to have electricity 
provided to their home, they would be expected to pay the cost of 
connecting the household to the electricity grid, a portion of the amortized 
operating and maintenance cost of the bulk infrastructure required to 
generate and distribute electricity, and a volumetric rate for the marginal 
cost of every kilowatt hour of electricity consumed. 
 
Cost recovery measures are aimed at recouping costs so that municipal 
service providers can balance their finances to avoid deficits and stabilize 
their finances for further delivery. The revenue obtained from cost recovery 
can be used to finance further service upgrades and expansions. It can also be 
used as a means of managing demand for scarce resources such as power and 
water by penalizing over-users or non-payers. Cost recovery also entails a 
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greater role for the private sector in providing services, for instance in 
installing and upgrading meters.  
 
Cost recovery measures have been adopted as policy on the national level. 
For example, the Municipal Services Act of 2000, which deals with 
municipal services throughout the country, includes the provision that 
services should be ‘cost reflective’ (DPLG, 2000: 74.2.d). Cost recovery has 
also been included in the policies which apply specifically to electricity and 
water services. The White Paper on Energy Policy states that ‘government 
policy is to ... encourage energy prices to be as cost reflective as possible’ 
(DME, 1998: 7). In the water sector, the White Paper on Water and 
Sanitation states that ‘government may subsidize the cost of the construction 
of basic minimum services but not the operating, maintenance or replacement 
costs’ (RSA, 1994: 19). The subsequent White Paper on Water Policy (1997) 
took the cost recovery approach further by proposing that ‘to promote the 
efficient use of water, the policy will be to charge users for the full financial 
costs of providing access to water, including infrastructure development and 
catchment management activities’(RSA, 1997: 4). Legislation has also made 
it necessary for municipalities to implement cost recovery, through reducing 
the funding they receive from national government and by putting a cap on 
the taxes that they may levy. For example, the Draft Local Government 
Property Rates Bill (2000) states that government can ‘set a limit on the 
amount of the rate that municipalities may levy on property, or the 
percentage by which a rate of property may be increased annually’ (RSA, 
 45 
2000: Chapter Two, Section Five). This encourages municipalities to push for 
greater cost recovery as a means of financing their operations.  
 
While the adoption of cost recovery policies seems to undermine promises of 
redistribution, some aspects of government policy on water and electricity do 
take into account the long history of inequality in South Africa, by paying 
attention to questions of equitable service distribution. The Bill of Rights in 
the constitution, which was ratified in 1996, clearly states that ‘everyone has 
the right to have access to sufficient food and water’ (RSA, 1996: Chapter 
Two, Section 27). As a result, the White Paper on Water acknowledges that 
while cost recovery is an integral part of policy this has to also include 
provisions that ‘some or all of these charges [may] be waived’ (RSA, 1997:  
4). The National Water Act (1998) also states that government should take an 
assertive role in ensuring water equity:  
 
The Minster may from time to time, after public consultation, establish a 
pricing strategy which may differentiate among geographical areas, 
categories of water users or individual water users. The achievement of 
social equity is one of the considerations in setting differentiated charges 
(RSA, 1998: Section 5.1, my italics).  
 
The legal status of the right to access electricity is harder to ascertain. For 
example, the constitution does not include access to electricity in the Bill of 
Rights. However, the Draft White Paper on the Energy Policy of the Republic 
of South Africa states that: 
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The state must establish a national energy policy which will ensure that the 
national energy resources shall be adequately tapped and developed to cater 
for the needs of the nation. Energy should therefore be available to all 
citizens at an affordable cost. Energy production and distribution should not 
only be sustainable, but should also lead to an improvement of the standard 
of living for all the country’s citizens (DME, 1998: 7).  
 
The government has achieved some major successes in its attempts to roll out 
basic water and electricity infrastructure. For example, the 2007 Community 
Survey conducted by Statistics South Africa, which provides a socio-
economic audit of municipal statistics, indicates that access to electricity by 
household has risen from 69.7% in 2001 to 80% in 2007, with almost all 
households (94%) being electrified in the Western Cape (StatsSA, 2007: 4). 
At the same time, 88.6% of the population had access to piped water by 
2007. This is a success which must be attributed to government service 
policies. Although the government has adopted cost recovery measures, it has 
still taken an interventionist role in poverty alleviation through spending on 
welfare and service delivery. Despite the controversies over its economic 
policies, the government has maintained an emphasis on redistribution seen 
in the large amounts of social spending, with even a critical view describing 
South Africa ‘as more of a welfare state than any other country in its category 
of per capita income’ (Lootvoet and Freund, 2006: 256). This has also meant 
that the state has adopted policies such as indigence clauses, progressive 
block tariffs and free services to mitigate the effect of the cost for those who 
are not able to pay for services due to poverty.  
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Nevertheless, the government’s adoption of cost recovery measures has been 
bedevilled by controversy. The most persistent problem has been that of high 
debts and service arrears. For example, in 2001 Eskom reported that debts in 
the greater Soweto area amounted to more than R1.1 billion (Eskom, 2001). 
In the same year, residents of Khayelitsha owed the City of Cape Town more 
than R231 million in arrears for rates, water, sewerage, sundries and refuse 
removal (Cape Argus, 20 February 2002). It has often been argued that these 
debts are not principally the result of an unwillingness to pay but because 
costs were too high for most users. In the case of Soweto, Maj Fiil-Flynn 
writes that residents ‘repeatedly stated that they are willing to pay for (good 
quality) services but are simply unable to pay the full amount of their bills 
with low or unstable incomes’ (Fiil-Flynn, 2001: 16). On a national level, the 
non-payment of services rose to R40 billion in 2005, which is a third of the 
total revenue of all municipalities (Ruiters, 2006: 134). This inability to pay 
for rates has frustrated attempts to achieve cost recovery and has often forced 
municipalities to initiate wide-scale debt write-offs. 
 
Cost recovery measures have also been perceived as being unfair in that poor 
customers may pay higher rates than the well-off. As McDonald (Mail and 
Guardian, 26 May 2003) points out in the case of Soweto: 
 
The price of electricity went up by as much as 400% as the pricing system 
moved from ‘flat rates’ to ‘tariff structures’ (the more you use, the more you 
pay). Worse yet, new tariff structures are often regressive, with residents in 
townships and former homeland areas sometimes paying more per kilowatt 
hour of electricity than suburban residents and industry. In 2001 rural South 
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Africans were paying as much as 48 cents a kilowatt hour while industry 
paid as little as 3 cents (the cheapest industrial rates in the world).  
 
3.5  Government Responses to Illegalities 
 
Cost recovery policies have had a direct bearing on the methods which 
government uses to deal with non-payment and theft, as illegalities obviously 
undermine effective revenue collection. Accordingly, government has 
launched various programs to deal with the problems of widespread non-
payment and theft. Chief amongst these has been the initiative Operation 
Masakhane (‘Let’s Build Together’) which was launched in 1995 with the 
aim of ending the so-called ‘culture of non-payment’. In his speech at the 
launch of the campaign, then State President Nelson Mandela (1995) argued 
that while non-payment had been an important tool in the fight against 
apartheid, it was no longer necessary under a democratically elected, multi-
racial government. Mandela further argued that payment of services is an 
expression of responsible citizenship: ‘with freedom comes responsibility, 
the responsibility of participation ... We all have the responsibility to pay for 
what we use, or else the investment will dry up and the projects come to an 
end’. Mandela suggests here that government is concerned with inculcating a 
culture of service payment, in order to fund further development. The 
developmental necessity of payment has been consistently emphasized by 
government officials.  
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At the same time, government has viewed post-apartheid illegalities as 
criminal actions, which should be actively penalized. In a 2001 speech Jeff 
Radebe, then Minister of Public Enterprises, argued that illegal connections 
were encouraged by anti-government elements who aimed to capitalize on 
the problems government had experienced with service delivery: ‘our 
collective failure to respond has allowed an opportunistic element to hijack 
the situation for its own political and criminal agenda’ (Radebe, 2001). This 
was echoed by Ronnie Kasrils (2003), then Minister of Water Affairs and 
Forestry, who argued that illegalities are a direct threat to social 
development:  
 
… we will take action against people who abuse the system and steal water 
through illegal connections and tampering with meters. This is necessary to 
ensure that our systems continue to function, to preserve law and order, and 
to make sure that we are able to continue to provide free basic water to those 
whose need is so terribly great. 
 
Officials have also asserted that citizens should view electricity and water as 
commodities which require payment, and not as natural rights. For instance 
the South African Revenue Protection Agency’s Annual Report in 1998 
states that ‘electricity is a commodity just like any other energy sources ... 
people do not expect to walk out of a shop without paying for any of these 
commodities, why then is electricity any different?’ (Mkwanazi, 1998).  
 
In order to ensure payment for services, and correspondingly control illegal 
access, government has employed a variety of different tactics. Generally, 
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municipalities will employ a range of these different responses to ensure 
payment. It is possible to identify several responses based upon the different 
approaches which are used to deal with widespread non-payment. The first 
approach entails the use of punitive methods, such as cut-offs, which aim at 
punishing non-payment. The second is the technological approach of using 
pre-payment meters to prevent non-payment. The final approach entails 
negotiating with users to ensure payment.  
 
3.5.1 
 
Disconnections, Cut-offs and Evictions 
The most coercive method that has been used to achieve cost recovery is that 
of service disconnections for non-payment. Cut-offs and disconnections refer 
to the deliberate termination of electricity or water services for reasons of 
non-payment. Cut-offs are performed by the state or private companies with 
the assistance of the police or hired security. Service cut-offs are not a post-
apartheid era innovation. Historically, white councillors, farmers or mine 
supervisors would cut off water as a means of punishing black communities 
and tenants (Greenberg, 2004). The apartheid government also used 
disconnections as a means of both punishing and recovering costs from 
townships which were involved in rate boycotts (Chance, 2006). Since 1994, 
water and electricity service cut-offs for non-payment have become a major 
enforcement method which has been implemented by municipalities 
throughout South Africa (McDonald, 2002: 169-70). In the case of 
electricity, disconnection entails being removed from electrical service due to 
unpaid arrears. When arrears are paid or debts are written off, users may be 
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reconnected by Eskom or municipal providers. In the case of water, cut-offs 
affect both piped tap water which is inside a dwelling and on site (so-called 
yard taps). Cut-offs may also affect communal or standpipe public tap water. 
Again, service is restored when arrears are paid or written off. In both the 
electricity and water sectors, supplies may be restored on the condition that 
users install a pre-paid meter device in order to prevent further debt 
accumulation.  
 
The extent to which disconnections and cut-offs have occurred has been a 
matter of some controversy. According to McDonald (2002: 170) by 2001, 
3.5 million people had their water cut off for non-payment, while 3.25 
million had their electricity disconnected. These figures can be further 
extrapolated to include the number of people in households affected by cut-
offs. McDonald argues that the total number of people affected by water cut-
offs in this period is just under 10 million, with a similar number being 
affected by electricity cut-offs. These figures have been widely used, but 
have been contested by DWAF officials who argue that the direct questions 
used in the survey (e.g. ‘Have you had your water/electricity cut off for non-
payment in the last year?’) invite affirmative answers (Hemson and Owusu-
Ampomah, 2005). Respondents who replied affirmatively, could have been 
indicating that they had experienced interruptions for other reasons, such as 
technical faults, which may have led them to believe that they had been cut 
off for non-payment. Even if this is taken into account, the number of cut-
offs for non-payment of electricity alone could be as high as 4 to 5 million 
users in the decade since 1994.  
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Municipalities have also taken measures against users who are illegally 
connected to services. These measures include the destruction of illegal 
infrastructure, through tearing out cables and piping to prevent further 
reconnections. Municipalities have also performed surprise raids on 
communities which are suspected of having a large number of illegal 
connections. Finally, municipalities have in some cases instituted legal 
actions and seized the property and buildings of non-payers in an attempt to 
recover some costs (Fjeldstad, 2004). These methods have been perceived as 
draconian and have in some communities been met with widespread 
resistance (Harvey, 2005; McKinley and Veriava, 2005). Resistance to the 
disconnections and evictions has been a mobilizing pivot for new social 
movements: both the Gauteng-based Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee 
(SECC) and the Western Cape based Anti-Eviction Campaign (AEC) were 
founded on community mobilization around these issues.  
 
3.5.2 
 
Pre-Paid Meters 
The technology most widely used to ensure payment for water and electricity 
is pre-paid metering devices (PPMs). PPMs require the user to buy credit to 
input in the meter in order to receive services. This system has several 
benefits for municipalities and utilities. With PPMs users must pay before 
they use electricity or water. This guarantees a revenue stream and prevents 
the accumulation of arrears. It also allows service providers to avoid dealing 
with the problems of debt collection and disconnections. Pre-paid meters 
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require that customers purchase units and charge the meter. Users who cannot 
afford the upfront payment of units effectively disconnect themselves from 
the service. As Harvey points out this avoids the problem of ‘politically 
explosive’ service cut-offs, because self-disconnections occur within the 
homes of users (Harvey, 2005: 121). Pre-paid water meters work much like 
pre-paid cell phones. In the case of water, users buy an electronic card with 
credit corresponding to a certain amount of water. The card is then inserted 
into a machine which is attached either to a household water meter or a 
public standpipe. Water can then be accessed until the credits run out, at 
which point the service will automatically disconnect. Pre-paid water meters 
are often used in conjunction with flow restrictor or trickler devices which 
provide a very restricted supply of water. In the case of electricity, units are 
bought at a vendor or can be purchased via a cell phone using an SMS (‘short 
message service’ or text message). Again, once the household units are used 
up, the electricity supply will automatically stop. This system is designed to 
prevent arrears, but there have been cases where meters have been tampered 
with to provide free services or to alter the billing amount. However, 
improved metering design has meant that tampering can result in automatic 
disconnection and prosecution by the service provider.  
 
PPMs are now widely used in South Africa. By 2006, over 2 million 
electricity pre-paid meters had been installed nationally (StatsSA, 2006). 
They have also been widely used in the water sector. One of the largest 
projects of this kind is Johannesburg City’s Operation Gcin’amanzi (isiZulu 
for ‘save water’) which by 2007 has installed over 78 000 meters (Barradas, 
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2007). PPM technology has also proved to be controversial especially with 
regards to its use in water delivery. It has been argued that restrictor devices 
pose a major health risk and discriminate against the poor. This argument 
was supported by a 2008 Johannesburg High Court ruling which ruled that 
PPM water devices are ‘unconstitutional and unlawful’ (allafrica.com, 6 May 
2008). Although the city is appealing the judgement, the ruling shows that at 
the very least, PPMs are a highly controversial technology.  
 
3.5.3 Provision of Free Basic Services
 
    
Government has also used several incentives to encouragement payment for 
services. The main mechanism for mitigating the effects of cost recovery for 
the poor has been the introduction of free basic services. The free basic water 
policy entails the provision of an amount of water that should be provided 
free to poor households to meet basic needs, with an amount currently set at 
6kl per month per household within 200 meters per dwelling. Free basic 
electricity is based upon the same principle with an amount currently set at 
50 kWh per month per household (RSA, 2003; 4). Access to these free basic 
services requires users to register in terms of the Indigent Grant Policy, 
which is being implemented by municipalities. Once the free monthly 
‘lifeline’ services are used up, users have to pay for services. As a result 
many municipalities include the provision that households which receive free 
basic service install pre-paid meters to ensure payment. For example the 
indigent policy of Mogale City includes the conditions that households can 
only qualify for free basic services once they have a meter installed (Mogale 
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City, 4 July 2006) . This is to ensure that free services are cross-subsidized by 
payment once users have finished the lifeline service. Activists have argued 
that the free basic policy does not provide substantive access and is merely a 
way for government to meet its minimum requirements at the lowest possible 
cost (Bond and Dugard, 2008). There have also been bureaucratic problems 
around the implementation of the indigent grants with beneficiaries not being 
informed of their status and delays in implementation. 
 
3.5.4 
 
Debt Write-Offs 
The inability of many poor users to pay off high arrears has resulted in 
municipalities offering the incentive of debt write-offs. In some cases this has 
taken the form of wide-scale write-offs for communities that have accrued 
high arrears. For example, in 2007 the City of Cape Town decided to write-
off R1.5 billion of service debts that had accumulated before September 2003 
(Cape Town Unicity, 2007). This write-off is not an act of charity and is 
clearly intended to ensure future payment, as it comes with the provision that 
non-payers or those who did not register for the indigent policy could expect 
to face legal action. While this is an example of a blanket debt ‘amnesty,’ 
other municipalities allow individual users to negotiate debt payment. In the 
case of Mogale City, households can make an arrangement where a large 
portion of their outstanding debt is written off after registering their debt and 
making alternative payment arrangements with the metro (Mogale City, 4 
July 2006) These write-offs may be understood as a reprieve which is 
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intended to ensure that users begin to meet their payment obligations in the 
future. 
 
3.5.5 
 
Media and Education Campaigns 
Utilities and municipalities have also embarked upon media campaigns 
which are aimed at both encouraging payment and discouraging illegal access 
to services. Eskom in particular has launched several campaigns against 
illegal electricity connections. The most prominent of these has been the 
Izinyoka (‘snakes’ in isiZulu) campaign which is aimed at encouraging the 
public to report cable theft and which depicted those who connect illegally as 
being ‘snakes’. The media campaign for this included adverts in print, radio 
and television. These campaigns have included a particular focus on the 
dangers of illegal connections, such as their potential for causing fires 
through low-lying cables. Increasingly, illegal access is being pointed to as a 
major contributor to the country’s power shortages (SARPA, 2008). Eskom 
and several municipalities have opened hotlines where people can report 
incidents of illegal access. In some cases, whistleblowers have been 
financially rewarded for reporting illegal access (Cape Town Unicity, 2007). 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
While it is difficult to ascertain exact figures, illegalities are clearly a serious 
fiscal worry for water and electricity utilities. Non-payment and theft have 
severe consequences, such as less money for the maintenance and 
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implementation of infrastructure and higher costs for paying users. 
Government has identified this as a serious problem and has initiated several 
measures to ensure payment for services. This is underpinned by a moral 
argument that citizens should pay for the services they receive. However, it 
has also been argued that illegalities are a result of poverty and a concomitant 
inability to pay.  
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Chapter Four:  Field Work Findings  
 
I have three primary aims in this chapter. Firstly, I look at the manner in 
which illegal access is encouraged as both a direct means of gaining services 
and as a form of civil disobedience. Secondly, I explore the reasons which 
underlie the decision to illegally connect. I aim to identify some of the basic 
factors which lead to the creation of ‘unruly citizens’. Finally, I look at the 
extent to which popular illegalities are motivated by popular dissatisfaction 
with government service delivery. Are illegalities purely a reaction to 
material conditions or do they also function on some level as a kind of silent 
protest? With this in mind I aim to show at least some of the reasons why 
illegalities are still prevalent in the post-apartheid era despite government 
interventions such as free basic services. I use three case studies: an 
unserviced, informal settlement called Kennedy Road, in the eThekwini 
municipality; a serviced semi-formal township, the Harare section of 
Khayelitsha, Cape Town; and Extension Nine, a fully serviced township in 
Grahamstown. The three case studies are very different, and were thus able to 
provide me with a useful cross-section of different experiences regarding 
water and electricity services in South Africa.  
 
4.1 Kennedy Road, Durban 
 
Kennedy Road is a shack settlement of about 7 000 people which sits on the 
periphery of the middle class suburb of Clare Estate. The settlement sprawls 
between the Umgeni Road six-lane highway and the Bisasar Road landfill 
(one of the largest dumps in the southern hemisphere). Just below the 
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Kennedy Road settlement there is a World Bank sponsored methane 
conversion plant. Unlike the nearby settlement, the plant is extensively 
provisioned with electrical infrastructure. In 2001 the municipality took the 
decision to end its electrification programme in the shacks, based on the 
perception that the programme was too expensive and would encourage the 
spread of slums. This has turned Kennedy Road into a zone of illegality, as 
all new electrical connections are now illegal. While some residents still have 
legal meters which were installed prior to the de-electrification programme, 
most are connected illegally. Residents who want a connection will get in 
touch with contractors who appear to be municipal workers, or at least people 
with access to legal meters. Some users will pay directly to these contractors 
to install meters. Alternatively, people will pay to have lines installed to these 
meters which will than be run to their shacks for a monthly stipend. There are 
also cases in which people attempt to connect wires directly to power outlets. 
This is a far more dangerous practice as it runs the risk of causing shocks and 
electrical fires.  
 
There is a visible proliferation of illegal connections in the settlement 
indicating how commonplace it has become. Official water provision is 
equally dire with five public standpipes which service the community. This 
has seen the creation of an illegal water infrastructure with users paying to 
run piping directly from the taps to their homes. 
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4.1.1 
 
Abahlali baseMjondolo and Popular Illegalities in Kennedy Road 
Kennedy Road has attracted much media and academic attention in the past 
few years as it is the home of Abahlali baseMjondolo (isiZulu for ‘people 
who live in the shacks’) a social movement which since 2005 has agitated for 
better service delivery as well as opposing attempts to move shack dwellers 
out of urban areas in accordance with the KwaZulu-Natal government’s 
Eradication of Slums Act. The movement grew out of the previous residents 
committee. Abahlali was founded from an act of spectacular protest in early 
2005. After being denied permission for a legal demonstration, residents 
barricaded the nearby Quarry arterial road with burning tyres and mattresses 
to highlight their frustration with lack of services. This provided the spark for 
the nascent movement. Since 2005 its branches have grown at a rapid pace, 
with members in 36 shack settlements (primarily in KwaZulu-Natal, but there 
is now also a branch in the QQ section of Khayalitsha ). Although the 
movement has grown geographically its head offices are still based in 
Kennedy Road, and I used these headquarters as a platform from which to 
conduct my research and interviews. Abahlali has been the site of much 
academic interest (see for example Patel, 2005 and Pithouse, 2005 ). To 
avoid simply echoing this literature, I focus my discussion of Abahlali on 
their relationship to popular illegalities.  
 
As with the SECC, Abahlali has used illegal access as both a form of civil 
disobedience and as direct action. Although illegal connections were already 
prevalent before the founding of Abahlali, the movement has capitalised on 
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these already existing illegalities. It has attempted to make illegal 
connections safer for the community through using trained electricians from 
the community who then teach others how to connect safely. Abahlali has 
encouraged connections in defiance of government initiatives to end such 
activities. After a large-scale series of disconnections by the municipality in 
March, the movement launched, in another echo of SECC practice, its own 
‘Operation Khanyisa’ which aimed to reconnect residents who had been cut 
off. S’bu Zikode, Abahlali’s president explains that: 
 
Operation Khanyisa is of course connection of electricity by force, 
which is said to be illegal. All we say is that we do not need 
electricity but that it is needed for our lives. And this has proven itself 
in how at risk the lives of shack dwellers are without electricity. For 
example on the 14 July 2008 Kennedy Rd settlement was on fire and 
more than six hundred people were left homeless. On the 1 August 
again 22 people were left homeless after another shack fire broke out 
… it will be very stupid for shack dwellers to abide by laws which do 
not protect them from death. Most shack fires are caused by explosive 
paraffin stoves and stoves so the demand to install electricity becomes 
even more demanding and necessary. Especially as people who went 
to apply to buy electricity were chased out from eThekwini Electricity 
Dept. because of the policy that was passed in 2001 which made it a 
crime for shack dwellers to have electricity. So it is correct the shack 
dwellers were left with no other choice in order to survive but to be 
safe (email correspondence with S’bu Zikode, 18 August 2008).  
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All the members I spoke to agreed that illegal connections were necessary for 
survival in the shacks. Until they are offered legal access, illegal connections 
will continue to be used. They also blamed the municipality for criminalizing 
the entire community. The denial of services ‘is creating Izinyoka [illegal 
users, literally ‘snakes’]. People know that electricity is a basic right, and 
people need it’ (Interview with Zama Ndlovu, 26 March 2008). While 
Abahlali clearly encourages illegal access it is by no means the primary 
‘service provider’ in the settlement.  
 
4.1.2 
 
Interviews with Abahlali Members 
I conducted interviews with Abahlali members on their perspectives on 
illegalities. This proved particularly useful because they were able to offer 
explanations based on their perspectives both as activists and as residents of 
Kennedy Road. Zama Ndlovu argued that the nature of illegalities is hard to 
define in the settlement. As people who connect are aided by officials and 
pay a regular fee, the line between licit and illicit practise becomes blurred. 
As a result illegal connections are regarded as a legitimate form of service 
delivery: ‘I pay for electricity so who can say that I am illegal?’ (Interview, 
26 March 2008). She maintained that shack dwellers were being stigmatised 
as criminals who erode electricity supply through theft. On the contrary 
illegal connections power very little – ‘only basic appliances’. Because shack 
dwellers are seen as anti-social and as born criminals they are preyed upon by 
corrupt elements within the municipality. In her own case her computer had 
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been confiscated by the police who claimed that it must be stolen if it belongs 
to a shack dweller. In other cases police officers would ‘collect’ cellular 
phones and other electronic equipment from residents and then charge them a 
fee to retrieve their property. She said that this was both blatant corruption 
and a form of psychological abuse which aimed to erode squatters’ rights to 
such commodities.  
 
Fanuel Nsingo, another young member, elaborated on many of the points 
Zama had raised. He argued that the extent and danger posed by popular 
illegalities to the state’s ability to provide electricity is deliberately 
exaggerated: 
 
The people in shacks in the whole of South Africa can’t take up the 
full 4 000 MW of electricity that is needed for the whole of the 
country. If you look at the mines when there was the whole load 
shedding thing and power rationing thing the mines were the most 
affected, so you can prove the mines take up most of the electricity, 
not shack dwellers. If you talk to shack dwellers and disconnections, 
[illegal users] are using just one line. Just imagine that they are just 
sharing what is passing through. They are not taking it from the main 
switch they are just using passing electricity. It is just passing current 
that is being taken (Interview with Fanuel Nsingo, 29 April 2008).  
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Therefore, Abahlali activists believe that shack dwellers are unfairly blamed 
by the media and municipality in an attempt to assign blame for South 
Africa’s electricity woes. He went on to say: 
 
The municipality took photo snaps of that one electrical pole which 
had illegal connections. Than the one pole represented all the shacks 
in South Africa to mean that electricity is being stolen in this way but 
now they have to prove that it is being stolen from these shacks. They 
go to one pole in Kennedy Road or Jadhu Place [another Abahlali-
affiliated settlement] and say that the pole represents all the illegal 
connections. They don’t even mention where they picked the pole 
from but now it’s representing all the illegal connections in shack 
dwellings in whole of South Africa.  
 
Nsingo continued that connections are prevalent because of material needs 
and not an inherent resistance to payment:  
 
There are many problems without electricity. We have kids, guys, and 
it is not safe for them. We have come out of the apartheid system, but 
now they are colonizing the children. They have to do their 
homework in the dark. They are reading books in the dark, or maybe 
just using candles. Maybe the family can just afford a candle per day, 
now you need extra packets for candles for the homework … the 
industries I am going to work at, I am given a meagre salary or wages, 
whatever, so that small salary is taken away from me by thieves 
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because there is no lighting where I pass when I go back to work or 
come back. Even during the weekend I can’t loiter around here seeing 
my friends and relatives so it is very dangerous. 
 
He saw the de-electrification policy as an officially mandated attack on the 
poor which is a disaster for the poor: 
 
Because we are denied electricity what are we supposed to do but get 
illegal connections. As I put it previously shack dwellers are not 
baboons or monkeys, we are people too we need to be listened to … 
Just imagine this highway, the N1 from here to Beitbridge Bridge [a 
major bridge on the border of South Africa and Zimbabwe in 
Limpopo Province] with no electricity, there is no floodlights at any 
given point of the N1 and cars just get like this … smashing and 
piling, smashing and piling. But now they want to cause this 
smashing and piling on us. Look at the [methane conversion] station 
there: I don’t know if it’s a bio-station or what. It has more than ten. 
Ten floodlights! But just imagine how many square metres it is. Very, 
very small place that one … but in Kennedy Road we are saying that 
if we just had ten floodlights just imagine how colourful it would be.  
 
I also conducted two interviews with S’bu Zikode. Zikode said that there is 
no mystery behind illegal connections: 
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Why do people connect? Because electricity is a basic human right. It 
is needed for survival. Without electricity it is life-threatening in the 
shacks. This is because of such things as fires. Electricity gives power 
to the people. We have the saying in South Africa ‘amandla’ which 
means power. Electricity is amandla. It gives power (Interview with 
S’bu Zikode, 29 April 2008).   
 
He regards the struggles around service delivery as being primarily a moral 
issue:  
 
The refusal of the city to provide services is a moral issue. We in the 
shacks are even worse off than people in the townships. At least they 
have access to water and electricity. They say Durban is a world class 
city. It will only be a world class city when people are treated 
decently. They have this high level of technology but people are 
denied access to it … If you look at this Slums Act it is a move back 
to apartheid-era laws like the Group Areas Act. If you cannot afford 
to live in the city you are driven out. Look at the laws they now have 
in the city against street traders. They are criminalizing people, 
criminalizing poor people (Interview with S’bu Zikode, 26 March 
2008).  
 
This is seen in the techniques the city uses to deal with illegal connections. A 
few weeks prior the police had launched an operation to cut off connections 
on one side of Kennedy Road: 
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It was an attack on the dwellers. People who have had electricity for 
years have been cut off. There was the SAPS with a private security 
company. They rolled up cords and cut connections. They came when 
they knew people would be away at work. The first to come were 
officials, who were followed by the police. They even brought the 
dog unit. There were about twenty vehicles cordoning off the area. 
They turned it into a no-go area for a few hours. Some residents even 
had physical confrontations with the police (Interview with S’bu 
Zikode, 26 March 2008). 
 
Zikode maintained that illegal connections provide an important survival 
function for residents and are not regarded as an illegal activity by many of 
the community:  
 
Electricity is cheaper than paraffin. Paraffin is linked to the petrol 
price, to the oil price and is always going up. It [electricity] is also a 
lot safer than paraffin which causes fires … before 2001 people could 
buy their electricity legally. But now they are denied the right to 
access. So the Council legally installed boxes and issued cards but 
now they say people are stealing. But then how do you tell who is 
stealing and who is not? Who is actually stealing? And if we are 
stealing why is the municipality accepting my money (Interview with 
S’bu Zikode, 30 April 2008).  
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Zikode concluded by saying that Abahlali was not opposed to the 
government but was trying to use civil disobedience and direct action as a 
means of winning a more interventionist role from the state: 
 
They must act rather than react to disasters like fires. They must take 
an initiative role. People are born in the shacks and they will die in 
the shacks. These are people’s houses because it is all they can afford. 
If you look at all the national protests and riots it is not just about 
service delivery. Service delivery is not the main issue; the main issue 
is human dignity. People want to be regarded as human beings. They 
want alternatives and not just more lies. We want housing which is 
safe and creates a safe environment where people can live with 
dignity. And they want to be consulted by government … government 
calls this ‘service delivery protest’ because they always assume they 
know what people want. Democracy is not about loyalty to the party 
and just receiving orders. It is about listening to people. It is about 
giving a voice to the marginalised.  
 
4.1.3 
 
Interviews with Other Kennedy Road Residents 
I also conducted several interviews with residents who are illegally 
connected, but who are not necessarily linked to Abahlali. Because of the 
highly sensitive nature of my questions (some residents thought that I was 
working for the municipality) the interviews were very informal and I was 
not able to use a voice recorder. The respondents also asked to remain 
 69 
anonymous. I spoke both to residents who were illegally connected as well as 
people who had had their supply cut off in the disconnections. Residents who 
were illegally connected told me that it was a matter of necessity: ‘we need it 
for ironing and getting the kids ready for school. I need to able to do ironing 
because the children need to be smartly dressed for school. As a parent it is 
my job’. At the same time illegal connections carry their own financial 
burden: ‘Often at the end of the month, I can’t pay for the connection. So we 
change back to paraffin. But paraffin is too expensive. The connection costs 
R150 a month which is also too expensive. Even though it is expensive we 
still pay because we need electricity’.  
 
Residents who had been cut off found that their quality of life had greatly 
declined with their sudden lack of access. One man told me that ‘I can’t use 
my fridge and my iron. I can’t watch DVDs or watch the news on TV. It’s 
unfortunate that the television doesn’t come with batteries’. Another woman 
found that she could no longer use her sewing machine which she relied on as 
an extra source of income. But despite the heavy-handed tactics of the 
municipality she was unbowed: ‘I wasn’t around when they came to do the 
disconnections. I would still love to reconnect. It will cost me R100 to 
reconnect. I will ask my neighbour and they will negotiate for me to get a 
connection’. Residents were also angry at the municipality’s handling of the 
disconnections, which they felt was an attack on their right to survive and 
live within the city:  
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We can’t use paraffin stoves because they are not safe. They burst 
easily. They are expensive so people have started buying cheap stoves 
which are not SABS approved … the police came here and ripped up 
all the wires. There’s nothing we can do about it. They say illegal 
connections are not safe but that’s not true. It is very safe with 
electricity. The underground wires are safe. It is the Council who are 
causing these fires. It takes three hours for a fire engine to come when 
you call them. 
 
He concluded that attempts to push shack dwellers out of cities were futile: ‘I 
live here because it is very close to where I work. I am not going to move to 
government houses. They are too far away and taxis from there are too 
expensive.’  
 
Illegalities seemed to serve a dual role in Kennedy Road. The municipality 
had deemed the residents and the settlement illegal and so refused to provide 
services. In this space the residents had carved out a complex illegal 
infrastructure to meet their service needs. This functions as a kind of shadow 
state, as residents still pay to receive access. This is symptomatic of Bayat’s 
‘quiet encroachment’ in which the poor use everyday practices of survival to 
win a place in the urban environment (Bayat, 2000, 24, Pieterse, 2005). At 
the same time the existence of Abahlali showed that this is not just a case of 
development from below in which the poor evade the state to focus on their 
own localized practices (Scott, 1998). Instead there seemed to be a great 
desire for positive government intervention. While residents illegally connect 
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as a matter of necessity, they still look to the state for substantive material 
improvements in their community.  
 
4.2  Harare Section, Khayelitsha 
 
Khayelitsha, which means ‘New Home’ in isiXhosa, is one of the largest 
townships in South Africa. Situated on the Cape Flats it was founded by the 
apartheid government in 1985 as a way of keeping a burgeoning black 
population out of the city after the end of formal influx control laws (Worden 
et al, 1998). To this day it remains a sprawling mix of both formal houses and 
informal shacks. Khayelitsha has received a large amount of infrastructural 
investment from the Cape Town Unicity with the construction of a large 
CBD. The township (which should really itself be regarded as a city, in terms 
of its size and population), has been described as a perennial debt headache 
for the Unicity. In 2002 it was claimed that residents owed over R231.6 
million in unpaid service rates (Cape Argus, 20 February 2002). The city has 
instituted various measures to ensure payment. After a court ruling in 2005 
the municipality has stopped installing pre-paid water devices but has 
instituted trickler devices.  
 
I conducted interviews with Senza Kula, a community activist, and with an 
anoymous Harare resident who is in chronic debt with the municipality. Kula 
is the president of Ilitha Lomso, a youth-based community organization 
which focuses on environmental and water rights. Kula says that high rates of 
non-payment and illegal access in the township are not the product of a 
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culture of non-payment but a combination of lack of infrastructure and 
chronic poverty and unemployment: 
 
There is very undeveloped infrastructure here such as poor piping 
which leads to leaks which then leads to high bills. The city writes off 
debts but after the debts are cleared they will start again. The write-
offs also mean that people are obliged to pay in the future. It is a 
forced commitment. This is a short-sighted approach. We want them 
to take a holistic approach … It is an issue of revenue versus people, 
of water prices versus people. Under Helen Zille the water 
disconnections have stopped. But in the Cape Flats there are still 
electricity cut-offs. In terms of debt they target people in months like 
December, when people are using a lot of water and electricity. That’s 
when the pink slips are rolled out (Interview with Senza Kula, 4 
April, 2008). 
 
He argues that certain initiatives may actually perpetuate non-payment while 
not meeting users’ needs:  
 
As Ilitha Lomso we want the provision of 50 kl of water as per the 
World Health Organisation agreement. As it is now, the policy is 
based on the assumption that there are four people in every household 
which does not take into account the actual number of people living in 
each house. Another problem is that the city does not communicate 
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how pricing actually works. This perpetuates debt. I would say that 
only 5% of residents actually understand how the bills work. 
 
Government initiatives to end illegal connections also appeared to have 
failed. Residents from the informal settlements which surround the legal 
housing will pay residents for connections to their meters. These connections 
are visible all over Harare section as the wires run under roads directly to 
houses. Kula added that: ‘The Izinyoka campaign has failed. People now 
steal from poles in the day. It is commonly accepted’.  
 
I also interviewed a resident who lives on shack stand which abuts the N2 
Freeway. She shares a trickler standpipe with several of her neighbours. 
Because of the meagre stream of water which this receives, taps are kept on 
all the time in order to collect water in buckets. As a result people from the 
informal QQ section, which is across the road, will apparently come and steal 
water at night. Despite being on the trickler system she still receives invoices 
from the city. She is unemployed, has two daughters and is currently R18 000 
in debt. She seemed resigned to poor treatment from the municipality: 
 
The toilets here are not working. They can’t be locked. They are 
broken but the municipality does not fix them. The people from the 
municipality come and use them … The rich do not have to pay like 
we do. They can afford to pay. Everything is too expensive these 
days.  
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As with Kennedy Road, illegal connections in Khayelitsha seem to be a form 
of silent encroachment, in that residents are connecting in the absence of 
substantive official provision. The major difference is one of scale: the 
township is growing at an exponential rate and it appears as if government 
does not have the capacity to meet the constantly growing demand for 
services. This problem is compounded by poverty, which means that people 
are unable to meet payment demands. Rather than unwillingness to pay, the 
situation appears one of inability to pay. The case of the resident is 
instructive in this regard. Although she is in chronic debt she still keeps all 
her bills which is hardly the behaviour of someone who is trying to cheat and 
avoid the state.  
 
4.3  Extension Nine, Grahamstown 
 
My final field work site is Extension Nine, a fully-serviced RDP township 
which is part of Grahamstown East. Extension Nine is a relatively new 
development as it was only established in 1999 (Moller, 2001). I visited 
Extension Nine several times throughout the year. While this was a valuable 
experience I found it hard to concentrate exclusively on popular illegalities. 
Whenever I visited and did door-to-door interviews people thought that I was 
a journalist, coming to report on their housing conditions. When I asked 
questions about illegal access or non-payment people would often become 
obtuse and tell me that they did not know about anything about this. 
Alternately they would mention that they had heard about people in their 
neighbourhood who were illegally accessing electricity but that they did not 
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know them personally. Generally I would be told that such behaviour was 
anathema and that as residents they frowned upon this as representing a 
dubious, even immoral means of acting. On the other hand people were 
generally forthcoming about the problems that they experienced as paying 
service receivers.  
 
Interviews with Extension Nine residents reveal the dissatisfaction people 
feel towards the municipality, but also their opposition to illegal connections. 
People felt that the electricity provided by the municipality was expensive 
and inadequate. For example, the amount of electricity provided is often 
insufficient to power several appliances at once. One resident showed me 
how his electricity supply was inadequate for the running of a cooker and a 
CD-player simultaneously. The purchasing of pre-paid vouchers was also 
considered annoying and inconvenient.  
 
One of my interviews was with a women resident who lives with her family 
in a government built house and who asked to remain anonymous. She has a 
pre-paid electrical meter installed but, like other residents, is unhappy with 
the amount of current provided as it does not meet her daily needs. Generally, 
she is dissatisfied with the level of service delivery due to a lack of 
communication from the municipality: ‘They will turn off without telling us 
because of load-shedding. Sometimes it will be off the whole day. It turns off 
when I need to get ready for cooking. I can survive without electricity but not 
the children as I can’t make food’. However, she was opposed to illegal 
connections:  
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If you can’t pay you don’t buy. It is not good to steal because you will 
get in a lot of trouble. Also if you try to play with the meter it will go 
black and turn off. The municipality can see if you have tampered 
when they open the board. People think that they are clever and 
cannot pay but if you are caught you will be in trouble. You will have 
to pay money to get re-installed. People don’t do that around here 
because they know that they will get in trouble. 
 
On the other hand she had not paid for water for some time: ‘I have not paid 
since 2000. They send me the accounts once a year. But they have never tried 
to cut me off. So now I am not paying but I still get water. The amount of 
water that I get now is fine because I can do everything I need to with it.’ She 
was worried that she may be punished for not paying at some point:  
 
I am not happy because I don’t know when the debts will stop. I am 
worried that they will come when I am out and cut me off. If you are 
not in your house they can come into your garden and cut off and you 
can do nothing to stop it. I can’t stop the municipality if they want to 
cut me off because it is their work. What can I do though because you 
can’t survive without water. 
 
I was assisted in this research by Vuyo Booi, who is a community activist 
and resident of Extension Nine himself. I interviewed him about illegalities in 
the area as he has lived in Grahamstown East for most of his life. He told me 
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that there was an amount of cable theft in the township as people would steal 
electrical cable to sell to a local scrap shop. He personally felt that these 
illegalities are dangerous:  
 
They put people in danger. Families lose out when these materials are 
stolen. They can’t use their fridges and television because they get 
fucked up by the theft … when the wires get cut at night everything is 
affected and stops working. It also takes forever for the cable to get 
repaid, replaced by Eskom. It takes months. 
 
I moved away from copper theft and asked about illegal connections.  
 
People connect themselves. Because the transmission is weak people 
can open the switch box, the meter box, and connect themselves. The 
meter box still reads but people don’t go and buy credits. 
 
Booi is opposed to this theft as he sees it as contributing to the national 
electrical shortage:  
 
People do it out of ignorance because if they get caught they will be 
in a lot of trouble. They will have to pay a lot of money which they 
can barely afford to Eskom. So people need to go with the pre-paid 
system. I know people are struggling to pay but they must abide by 
the rules. If you break them you are causing yourself unnecessary 
trouble. Also if lots of people start doing it will start affecting the 
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whole community. I believe that people in the township aren’t happy 
with people stealing electricity. 
 
In Extension Nine itself electrical theft is not such a problem but there have 
been cases where young people try to manipulate the meters without their 
parent’s knowledge: ‘They say it’s because they can’t afford to waste money 
on electricity bills. They have this thing called the viva system. They call it 
viva as it’s something that goes on forever.’ However he felt that this was not 
necessarily a form of political resistance:  
 
It could be a problem because people will be happy just with free 
services. People are facing a lot of poverty, a lot of unemployment. 
Government grants are not enough. Now we even have this food 
crisis. Because of this a lot more people may start doing this. So 
people want to reduce costs. This could lead the whole of society to 
think that they should stop paying, that they should go with this viva 
system. But personally, like I said, I feel that it’s wrong because it’s 
illegal. It undermines the law of the country. I know it’s hard for 
people but they shouldn’t just do this. They should learn about what’s 
going on in the world, about living in a capitalist society. They should 
remember what they were fighting for under apartheid. They should 
find ways to struggle for things like electricity. They should thing 
about how they can get it. They should find out why the things they 
want in the world aren’t happening. It not a solution to steal 
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electricity or copper because it’s not a revolution yet. So they are 
disturbing their community, they are disturbing the whole of society.  
 
He felt that such a strategy would only have validity in the case of 
widespread cut-offs such as those which precipitated the emergence of the 
SECC. At the same time he admitted that it’s likely that ‘such things are not 
creating most of this power crisis. I’m sure that if you did some research you 
would find that lots of big companies, even small companies, are doing the 
same thing’. The situation is also complex because there is widespread non-
payment of water as evidenced by the earlier interview:  
 
Most people don’t pay water. I’m one of them. People are 
unemployed or they are on the grant so at the end of the month they 
can’t afford to pay. Where are people supposed to get the money? 
People should do their thing until they come to cut them off. When 
they come they should ask the municipality how they expect them to 
live without water.  
 
Interviews with Extension Nine residents reveal that many South Africans are 
ambivalent about illegal connections and non-payment. While many 
interviewees are strongly opposed to illegal electricity connections, they 
consider non-payment of water bills an acceptable practice. Furthermore, 
dissatisfaction with service provision does not necessarily entail condoning 
of illegal connections. In communities like Kennedy Road, illegal 
connections have become normal practice, but in other communities, 
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particularly more formalised communities like Extension Nine, illegal 
connections are less widely accepted. Also, non-payment of water and non-
payment of electricity are not necessarily viewed in the same light. 
 
4.4  Conclusion 
 
The three sites reviewed all had local factors which lead to widespread 
popular illegalities. However there are also are also significant similarities. In 
all three communities, popular illegalities were caused by inability to pay and 
lack of access to services rather than a refusal to meet payment obligations. 
Because these illegalities are primarily driven by material needs they should 
be viewed as an explicitly anti-government strategy. However, the 
widespread dissatisfaction recorded in these findings suggests that many 
government service delivery initiatives are deeply unpopular with the 
citizenry. 
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Chapter Five:  Conclusion 
 
5.1  Introduction  
 
The aim of this thesis has been to explore the political significance of popular 
illegalities in post-apartheid South Africa. My fieldwork suggests that 
illegalities are primarily a material practice which provides benefits for the 
poor by providing access to basic services. I will argue that while illegalities 
are primarily motivated by a desire to improve material conditions, these 
practices have political significance as they provide for substantive popular 
access to resources for the poor as well as creating autonomous spaces of 
service delivery outside of official control.  
  
In this concluding chapter I begin by discussing some of the conceptual 
issues around popular illegalities and provide a working definition for its 
status in contemporary South Africa. After discussing its current 
ramifications, I raise some speculative points about its possible future 
significance. I conclude by arguing for its status as a significant political 
phenomenon which merits further study. In among the discussion I will also 
attempt to add to this by raising some questions which may be relevant for 
later academic study. Rather than trying to provide absolute answers to this 
my interest is in highlighting alternative ways of looking at popular 
illegalities. 
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5.2  What do Popular Illegalities Mean? 
 
Illegalities are inherently political. They are not just a reaction to poverty. 
However, in terms of post-apartheid South Africa, the political status of 
illegalities is ambiguous. Much of the literature which has emerged on social 
movements’ usage of illegalities suggests that these initiatives are an anti-
government tactic. At the same time this is reflected in much of the 
government rhetoric on mass illegality, which presents it as a series of 
criminal activities which are practised by nebulous, criminal elements which 
aim at destabilizing the country. Certainly, many of the social movements, 
including Abahlali baseMjondolo, subscribe to a critique of government 
policy and aim at building democratic institutions outside of the state 
apparatus. This has led to something of a conceptual confusion as some 
writers have been quick to see illegal access as representing the emergence of 
a popular vanguard against neo-liberalism (see for example Desai, 2003). 
This suggests confusion between the social movements who encourage 
illegal access and the everyday practise which flourishes even without any 
encouragement from them. My research suggests that illegalities are 
primarily the result of material factors rather than typically being an explicit 
attack on the state. They exist as an everyday survival technique aimed at 
winning concessions for the poor. Obviously those who connect illegally run 
the risk of confrontation with the authorities, but the decision to illegally 
connect or not to pay for services is not necessarily underpinned by anti-state 
feeling. People obtain illegal connections because they cannot afford or are 
denied access to services. They do not pay their bills because they cannot 
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afford to. Even where those committing these illegalities do feel resentful 
towards authorities, much of this resentment is aimed at municipalities and 
other local authorities rather than at national government. To put it another 
way, people who run illegal cables into their houses are not doing it to defy 
the World Bank or the other architects of global neo-liberal policies. They are 
doing it to bring heat and light to themselves. The anger I witnessed was 
typically directed at local authorities, at corrupt or disinterested police and 
municipal workers, and not at, for example, national macro-economic policy.  
 
In making this argument I do not, however, want to run the risk of 
depoliticizing illegalities or denying that they have a significance which goes 
beyond the concerns of day to day survival (see Chance, 2006). While I have 
criticised the assertion that popular illegalities should unproblematically be 
interpreted as political resistance, I am sympathetic to the idea that such 
illegalities embody a spirit of resistance. Even if this resistance is not clearly 
aimed at specific power structures and institutions it is still a reaction to the 
initiatives of these bodies. Without necessarily being aware of it, people who 
illegally access services are finding a way of subverting the practical 
consequences of neo-liberalism such as disproportionate service charges.  
 
This interpretation is supported by the historical study of illegalities. For 
example, while poachers in 18th Century Britain stole game chiefly to feed 
themselves, this practice was supported by ethical beliefs which were 
opposed to the emergent order of capitalism (Hay, 1975). An exclusive focus 
on the survivalist nature of illegalities may lead to the mistaken conclusion 
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that poor people uncritically accept lack of services and happily retreat into 
parallel economic structures. However, it is difficult to gauge the full 
significance of illegalities for the people who practise them, which may lead 
to the contrary mistake of assuming that it is reflective of a latent 
oppositional culture. Because illegalities are hidden as a matter of necessity, 
their full significance is often only gauged when they coalesce with more 
overt, organized political resistance. Illegalities are an evolutionary process, 
the practice of which changes over time as the conditions and nature of 
service delivery and access changes. Because they are clandestine and 
mutable, their significance is diffuse. But, as my research has shown, there is 
a general feeling of disappointment and anger with certain government 
initiatives, even if not explicitly with government itself, within the 
communities where illegalities are practised. If these concerns are not 
addressed what are now chiefly survival initiatives could indeed become part 
of an oppositional, even revolutionary force.  
 
5.3  Illegalities as Practice and Politics 
 
I therefore argue that popular illegalities are a common practice which  ought 
not to be interpreted as nothing more than a survival technique, but which is 
also not necessarily part of a strategy of resistance to government. These 
illegalities provide several substantive benefits which perhaps cannot be 
achieved through legal means. At the same this, everyday practices such as 
these have a significance which transcends the everyday benefits provided 
(Bayat, 2000). They have the potential to defy official policy and to 
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reconfigure urban space in a way which provides the poor with an autonomy 
which eludes the controlling power of the authorities. In this following 
section I will assess the main material benefits which are provided by 
illegalities based on my fieldwork findings. I will then argue that these 
material benefits have significant political ramifications.  
 
5.3.1 
 
The Material Benefits of Popular Illegalities  
All the illegalities described herein involve attempts to provide otherwise 
unobtainable material benefits. The nature of these material benefits differs 
from community to community, but there are three basic needs which 
underlie illegal access. Firstly, it can be used as a means of ensuring actual 
physical survival under harsh conditions. This was especially apparent in 
Kennedy Road. Due to the constant risk of shack fires, which is compounded 
by the active denial of legal access to residents, illegal connections are a 
matter of necessity. Without electricity, residents are forced to rely on 
paraffin stoves and candles which are a significant fire risk. Quite literally, 
electricity is a matter of life or death.  
 
But the material benefits provided by illegal connections transcend mere 
survival. Illegal connections are also used as a means of saving income for 
other basic needs. While residents in Kennedy Road still pay for their 
connections, access to electricity saves them money on paraffin and other 
natural gases which are becoming increasingly expensive. In Extension Nine 
people who use the ‘Viva’ system do so as a means of stretching income, by 
 86 
circumventing payment for a basic service. While several of my respondents 
saw this as an anti-social abrogation of payment obligations, it appeared to 
also be underpinned by a rational calculus. Because of the inadequate 
transmission provided to paying residents, they find themselves spending 
extra income on paraffin for cooking and heating purposes which undermines 
the reason for having legal services in the first place. Under such duress, 
tampering with the meter to receive free transmission seems a practical 
solution. Inherent in illegal access is an inversion of official attempts to 
create responsible paying consumers who calculate their usage of services 
with their income. ‘Illegals’ have already inculcated this cost-benefit ethos 
with the difference being that they consider illicit access to be the most 
rational way to make ends meet. There may thus be another way of looking at 
this. It may be argued that rather than a reaction to neo-liberalism widespread 
illegalities are in facts are its necessary outcome. If, as John Gray (1998) 
argues, neo-liberalism is a form of piratical capitalism, then illegal 
connectors are at the forefront of entrepreneurship.  They have inculcated the 
ethos of achieving benefits even if these are illegal. As in the heady dreams 
of some neo-liberal apologists, they are the entrepreneurial poor who have 
pulled themselves up by their bootstraps and gained services without relying 
on the government. I would tend not to support this argument, as it does seem 
that popular illegalities undermine many of the key tenets of neo-liberalism. 
But this still leaves a significant question: how can government expect 
ethical, responsible payment from its citizens in a social and economic milieu 
which encourages the pursuit of absolute self-interest.  
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Finally, illegal connections provide substantive access to various consumer 
goods which may otherwise be unobtainable. For instance, in Kennedy Road 
residents can enjoy the use of computers, televisions, fridges and irons, 
despite the grinding deprivation of their surroundings. There is a desire on 
the part of the urban poor to have access to these modern goods as this access 
helps them transcend their material conditions and provides a sense of 
dignity, of having the use of the benefits of a contemporary urban citizen. As 
Bayat (2000:549) writes, the poor want to be modern but on their own terms:  
 
Modernity is a costly affair; not everyone can afford to be modern. 
Since it requires the capacity to conform to the types of behaviour and 
mode of life (adherence to strict disciplines of time, space, contracts 
and so on) which most vulnerable people simply cannot afford. So, 
while the disenfranchised wish to watch colour television, enjoy clean 
tap water and possess security of tenure, they are weary of paying 
their taxes, bills or reporting to work at specified times.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
The idea that the poor wish to participate selectively in modernity seems to 
be borne out in the case of illegal connections in South Africa. Illegal 
connections often involve the modification and adaptation, even 
democratization of technology. This ability to adapt technology to suit 
communities’ needs also reveals an important site of tension in South African 
service delivery. Government has adopted various technological and 
bureaucratic measures, such as pre-paid meters, to both deliver services and 
to ensure payment. However, this technology is often viewed as inconvenient 
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or even oppressive by users. This opposition should not be seen as a rejection 
of modernity. Illegal connections are clearly a means of gaining access to 
modern amenities. It is modern techniques of social control and management 
which are being rejected, not technology itself. Popular illegalities show an 
adoption of modern technology which is aimed at meeting popular needs, not 
the state’s need to ensure revenue and monitor its citizenry. What is at stake 
here is not an atavistic refusal to pay for services, and to adapt to the rigour 
of modern citizenry. Instead, illegalities offer a counter-modernity. This is 
not the modernity of responsible consumers, but rather a modernity of public 
spaces and public goods.  
 
Finally, illegal connections provide a sense of safety and allow for the usage 
of small conveniences which soften the blows of living in a harsh 
environment. At the same time they provide a sense of linkage, even parity, 
with the outside world. By using their illegal connections people are also 
staking their claim as modern citizens who have as much right to technology 
as any legal users. The material benefits of illegalities become something 
more than just a way to survive. They reinforce a sense of human dignity 
against the duress and degradation of daily shack life. More than just an 
economics of survival, illegal access also allows for an economy of 
consolation. 
 
 
 
 
 89 
5.3.2 
 
The Practical Politics of Popular Illegalities  
Popular illegalities have significant political effects within the communities 
which practise them on a wide scale. This political significance is bound up 
with their material consequences. While they may not be intentionally 
performed as acts of dissent and resistance, they nonetheless subvert and 
undermine the capacity of the state to enact social control. In this section I 
will define what I consider to be the main consequences of this.  
 
5.3.2.1 Subversion and Alteration of Urban Space  
 
The creation of clandestine service infrastructure undermines official control 
of urban space. Squatter communities are inherently tenuous in that they are 
threatened by the efforts of governments and private developers to drive them 
out of cities. This puts them under a constant risk as residents’ security of 
tenure is always under threat. Squatters resist this process by encroaching on 
legal services in order to create their own spaces. Illegal access to water and 
electricity is a key component of this attempt to create a right to the city. By 
establishing semi-permanent infrastructure, squatters try to turn their 
communities into permanent urban homes. This functions as a kind of 
guerrilla warfare. They use the weak spots of the state, such as corrupt (or, 
perhaps, sympathetic) officials and unguarded electrical poles to their own 
benefit. Even when the state destroys illegal infrastructure, the wires and 
illegal connections will quickly spring up again. This undermines attempts to 
control, manage and ultimately erase their ‘delinquent’ communities from the 
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urban landscape. It also provides squatters with a significant foothold in the 
city, which, as they are ‘illegal’, they may not be able to establish through 
official channels. This gives a significant degree of power to the most 
vulnerable of urban dwellers.  
 
Previously I noted how popular illegalities also subvert the technology which 
the state uses to ensure social control. At the risk of needless repetition it is 
important to observe how this may put power in the hands of the poor. For 
example, PPMs are designed to ensure payment before the service is 
accessed. The practice of inserting wires and paper into the machines to 
receive free services completely reconfigures this purpose. A technology 
which may seem oppressive and impractical is mastered by citizens for their 
own ends, based on what they perceive to be their service requirements. It 
saves income and asserts autonomy through flagrantly bypassing the intended 
purpose of the technology. Along with denying a steady revenue stream to 
the authorities, it also forces them and their private contractors to develop 
new techniques of surveillance and control. However, tenacious or desperate 
citizens will always find a means of bypassing this and so this low-level 
‘arms race’ continues.  
 
5.3.2.2 Spaces of Autonomy and Development from Below 
 
Contrary to official stigmatization, it seems that many popular illegalities are 
not the work of anti-social bandits – atomized izinyoka who prey on the 
services of honest communities. Instead they are the result of complex social 
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practices and networks. The installation of illegal infrastructure entails 
negotiation and bargaining with municipal officials and residents with legal 
access. It also requires constant collective maintenance and repair of 
connections. In the case of Kennedy Road, illegal connections are designed 
to maximize safety and to ensure their continued status as a collective good. 
This highlights communities’ ability to autonomously and successfully self-
manage their illicit service delivery. In the presence of inadequate and 
unpopular government intervention this creates autonomous spaces of 
community control in which citizens take the improvement of their material 
conditions into their own hands. While this is illegal, it is not necessarily 
opposed to the state, as it may in fact be doing the authorities a favour by 
doing the jobs of legal service providers. An instructive case is that of 
Khayelitsha. Every year thousands of people move to the township from 
improvised rural and peri-urban areas in an attempt to make their way in the 
city. Diminished state capacity, high prices and chronic bureaucratic 
backlogs make it highly improbable that the authorities will be able to 
provide lights and water for this growing population. By illegally connecting 
themselves, residents are evolving their own service provision. Because this 
is performed by residents it may even be superior to official delivery as it is 
designed to meet everyday needs without having to focus on the proper 
procedures or on maximizing cost recovery. In future it may happen that the 
existence of this infrastructure may force the state to recognize its legitimacy 
as a means of providing services, as seen in the case of Brazil discussed 
earlier (see Neuwirth, 2004). Ironically this may in fact cohere with the 
initiatives of cost recovery – municipalities do not have to incur the high cost 
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of establishing the infrastructure and administering the (marginal) cost 
recovery, while at the same time their government imposed imperative to 
provide subsidized electricity for the poor is being met. However if this is 
kept within a level of community control it may still fulfil its original status 
as community-controlled service delivery.  
 
5.3.2.3 The Moral Economy of the Poor and a Culture of Resistance 
 
The prevalence of popular illegalities is also underpinned by a set of moral 
values which views services as collective goods which should be available 
for all. Rather than being subject to market forces or the demands of capital, 
electricity and water are seen as subject to a moral economy in which their 
price should be determined by ability and capacity to pay. This in itself offers 
a radical challenge to the commodification of services. It also suggests a 
fundamental factor of South African culture which policymakers would be 
foolish to ignore. Attempts to create ‘responsible’ neoliberal citizens are 
opposed to intrinsic cultural and moral beliefs and are thus likely to be met 
with some form of resistance.  
 
The persistence of popular illegalities into the post-apartheid period is also 
suggestive of a latent culture of resistance among the poor. Communities 
have a long historical record of mobilizing to resist government, and while 
this may lay dormant for a while, it can quickly be reactivated under 
oppressive conditions. This closely intersects with the practice of illegalities. 
In many ways, social movements like Abahlali are the political culmination 
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of years of quiet encroachment and mass appropriation of urban resources. 
Marginalized communities rely on existing organizational skills and social 
structures, such as the installation of clandestine infrastructure, to 
successfully form social movements. It is also possible that the psychological 
experience of illegal access nurtures a spirit of resistance. As illegal access 
becomes normalized people appreciate that they can improve their own lives 
outside of the official mechanisms of the state. The same holds for many 
social movements. Due to frustration with the official channels people find 
means of creating their own alternative structures to express grievances. 
Rather than waiting for official interventions they create their own, and in so 
doing assert their autonomy.  
 
It would be a mistake to assume that this resistance is simply an attempt to 
secure basic material improvements. Abhalali does not aim at achieving 
better service delivery alone, but at ensuring that squatters become 
substantive urban citizens with the right to determine their own future in the 
city. This offers an alternative form of modernity which is based not on 
authoritarian development initiatives but on community control. Illegal 
connections may have a radical role to play in this process. Through 
collectivizing their use, they become a direct means of claiming control of 
the commons and stand as a successful example of an alternative to 
commodified services.  
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5. 4 Popular Illegalities and the Future of South Africa 
 
Although it is difficult, if not impossible, to clearly ascertain the scale and 
nature of popular illegalities, my research suggests that they are a widespread 
activity. Although the types of illegalities will differ from community to 
community, the proliferation of informal settlements and the existence of 
widespread poverty in South Africa make it reasonable to assume that these 
illegalities are significant part of everyday life on a national level. Certainly it 
is prudent for government to worry about this, as at first glance it may appear 
a challenge not only to cost recovery initiatives but to its very ability to 
govern the country. This thesis has shown that popular illegalities are not the 
result of social breakdown but are representative of communities taking 
delivery into their own hands, which is often indicative of flaws and 
incapacities in official provisions. Rather than viewing this as a purely 
oppositional force, government should negotiate with communities. 
Repressive techniques of ensuring payment are counter-productive as they 
lead to resentment on the part of the citizenry.  
 
However, I do not want to run the risk of making the neoliberal self-help 
argument that the poor are tenacious and adaptable enough to be left to their 
own devices by the state. As my work has shown there is a great desire for 
more government intervention, not benign neglect. Now that people have 
won their legal status as citizens they want substantive material rights which 
include adequate, quality services. For these citizens access to services is not 
just a material right but a proof of citizenship and indeed of participation in 
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modernity itself. If government wants to stop delinquency on the part of 
citizens they may do best by paying attention to how illegalities actually 
improve people’s lives rather than viewing them as purely antisocial acts.  
 
It seems likely that popular illegalities will continue to play a significant role 
in South African politics. The international recession will have a direct 
impact on the scale of illegal access. With less money available for official 
development people will continue to utilize clandestine infrastructure. Legal 
customers may be tempted into seeking illegal access as a way of preserving 
increasingly meagre incomes. It is also likely that popular resistance to cost 
recovery initiatives will become even more overt. Under desperate conditions 
of austerity, citizens may refuse efforts to pay increasingly costly service 
charges, and will find new ways to subvert government initiatives.  
 
This is compounded by the fracturing of the ruling ANC. Factional fighting 
has undermined municipal delivery and contributed greatly to the crisis state 
of service delivery. This is further exacerbated by the emergence of new 
opposition parties which directly challenge the power of the ruling party. 
While the ANC will remain the dominant party in the foreseeable future, this 
new political landscape will have a direct bearing on service delivery. One 
possible option is that government may attempt to initiate populist service 
initiatives as a means of shoring up support, but this may be limited by the 
diminishing of government revenue in a climate of economic slow down or 
even recession. Whatever the case may be, it is clear that service delivery 
policies have fuelled general dissatisfaction with the ANC. This suggests a 
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latent oppositional force in South African politics: the legitimacy of the 
ANC’s history of struggle will count for little when people are unable to 
access adequate basic services.  
 
As a result social movements which offer alternative politics (and utilize 
popular illegalities) will continue to be significant players, as they offer 
alternative political spaces where official channels of protest are inadequate. 
Although much recent political commentary has focused on the individual 
power struggles within the ANC which have led to the split in the alliance, 
more important factors appear to be class and generational struggles. The 
study of popular illegalities allows us to view harbingers of future struggles. 
Rather than leading to state collapse, illegalities are the product of the 
dangerous rift between the rich and poor which presents the biggest threat to 
the future of South Africa. Popular illegalities are social fissures which we 
can study as a means of predicting and preventing this collapse before 
existing inequalities result in immutable chasms. Illegalities will continue to 
be a site of scholarly interest. They reveal the politics of everyday life and 
provide insights into possible future political developments. The reasons why 
people illegally connect are self-evident: what is important is what this 
practice can teach us. Embedded within such commonplace activities are 
entire new vistas of living in a fragmented, challenging world. The politics of 
illegalities may be the politics of the 21st
 
 century.  
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5.5  Conclusion  
 
The seeming dual nature of illegalities, their ability to create autonomous 
spaces while also revealing a belief in a more active, redistributive 
government has an important future significance which does not just confine 
itself to South Africa. The way in which illegalities function as an adaptive 
means of gaining access to resources may presage the way service delivery is 
achieved in the future, and not just for the poor. Rapid urbanisation is 
running up against two major factors: a declining government capacity is 
occurring in conjunction with environmental degradation, which threatens the 
very ability to provide water and electricity. Under such circumstances it is 
no feat of the imagination to envision that illegal access may soon be the way 
that the majority of humanity receives services. However, as argued earlier, 
this may not necessarily result in a Hobbesian fight for resources but may in 
fact entail new more equitable means of distributing resources.  
 
As Scott (1998) argues, places like slums are ‘illegible’ to the authorities as 
they are constantly changing and shifting over time, which makes it hard to 
impose systematic control over them. Castells (1998) argues that places like 
slums are representative of the black holes of globalization: places that are 
ignored by governments (except for rent-seeking and other extractive 
purposes) because they are seen as irrelevant to the global economy. But 
because they are not clearly mapped out, and are ignored by the powerful, it 
is possible that such places are important social laboratories where new ways 
of coping and thriving under harsh conditions are enacted and imagined. At 
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the same time the ambiguous nature of illegalities means that they may also 
not represent a symptom of the collapse of the state, but rather a change in 
the manner in which citizens deal with it. The desire for more state 
interventions runs up alongside a belief in a moral economy which views 
water and electricity as a shared good, not as an individualized commodity. 
Among those who illegal connect, there seems to be a basic desire for a just, 
redistributive system of government. Although calls for this kind of 
government have been drowned out by the triumphalism of market 
propagandists in the last few decades, the seemingly permanent crisis state of 
the global economy suggests that there may soon be a global shift to 
egalitarian, even socialist ideals. And if people start viewing services as 
something which should be based on a just price, if indeed paid for at all, 
who is to say what they may start demanding for free next? It may be 
simplistic to view illegalities as an anti-capitalist strategy, for as I have 
shown they also function as a form of commodity exchange, but they 
certainly suggest nascent ways of distributing resources which have 
significance far above just localized practices.  
 
Popular illegalities should be studied in terms of this creative potential. This 
brings us back to the trickster archetype discussed in Chapter Two. The 
prevalence of this myth in human history has a direct bearing on modern 
illegalities. Symbolically it suggests that subaltern groups have always 
celebrated evasion and low-level theft as a means of subverting the powerful, 
as they are unable to confront the authorities directly. The trickster chips 
away at the edifices of power. This not only forces short terms concessions, 
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by may have the ability to irrevocably alter the status quo. Stephen Belcher 
(2005: 74) writes: 
 
[Tricksters] add an element of disorder and unpredictability to the 
world: features which we all know by experience are present in our 
lives. Because the trickster can see past (or through) the rules, the 
trickster is also creative. The trickster is rarely intentionally so; the 
benefits of the tricksters are usually accidental afterthoughts. But they 
remain real.  
 
The description is also apt when thinking of the significance of popular 
illegalities. Without necessarily intending to do so, people engaged in such 
practices may in fact be reconfiguring the means in which resources are 
governed and distributed. At the very least, the practices of the communities I 
have described call into question the often arbitrary distinctions between 
legality and illegality, between licit and illicit practices. The potential 
consequences of popular illegalities have the capacity to transcend the local. 
As discussed earlier the widespread practice of internet piracy is what can 
only be described as a mass appropriation of intellectual property. This has 
forever reconfigured the manner in which people receive such services and 
has posed a serious threat to entertainment’s value as a saleable commodity. 
This illegality of the ‘better-off’ has been shown to have a revolutionary 
capacity. Surely it is possible that the illegal usage of water and electricity by 
the poor has the same latent ability to change the way in which services are 
valued and delivered. What may seem at first glance to be a criminal act is 
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something else entirely: the product of human cunning and courage which 
can flourish under the most adverse conditions.  
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